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WRONGFUL DISCHARGE REEXAMINED: THE CRISIS MATURES,
OHIO RESPONDS
As the crisis of wrongful discharge matures in the 1990s, fun-
damental changes to the employment-at-will doctrine are being
proposed. The 1980s saw the Ohio Supreme Court adopt a pub-
lic policy exception that brought Ohio employment law into ac-
cordance with most jurisdictions. The author proposes that the
Ohio Supreme Court take its analysis one step further and dis-
card the antiquated at-will presumption entirely.
DURING THE 1980s the employment-at-will doctrine was sub-
ject to an uncertain process of erosion by exception. Courts
fashioned a patchwork of exceptions to the at-will doctrine limited
the power of an employer to dismiss an employee "for good cause
or for no cause, or even for a bad cause."' Various jurisdictions
recognized that an employee could not be discharged in violation
of a public policy,2 in breach of an implied contract, 3 or in breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.4
Yet in the 1980s, the exceptions proved the rule. Only narrow
exceptions with limited applicability to the vast majority of em-
ployment terminations were recognized. Proposals to temper or
eliminate the doctrine were confined to the world of law review
articles. As the last decade of the twentieth century begins, how-
ever, the crisis of wrongful discharge has ripened, and "radical"
changes are being proposed, not only by academics but also by
judges, administrators, and attorneys.
In Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc.,
the Ohio Supreme Court recognized a public policy exception to
the employment-at-will "doctrine.5 Most jurisdictions had recog-
nized similar public policy exceptions in the 19 80 s,e but it was not
1. Payne v. Western & Aft. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 45-64.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 65-83.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 84-129.
5. 49 Ohio St. 3d 228, 233-35, 551 N.E.2d 981, 986-87 (1990).
6. Employment at Will: State Rulings Chart, [Individual Employment Rights Man-
ual] 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51-52 (Aug. 1989) [hereinafter State Rulings Chart]
(courts in 39 states have recognized public policy exceptions to employment at will); see
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until Greeley that the Ohio Supreme Court accepted a role in
shaping a rational policy of employment termination. 7
The Greeley decision, however, merely framed the issue and
suggested solutions to the employment-at-will crisis. This note de-
scribes some of the alternatives discussed in Greeley and calls for
a more fundamental approach to the employment-at-will crisis.
The first section of the note traces the development of the doctrine
from its nineteenth century origins. The second section analyzes
Ohio's treatment of the doctrine. The third section evaluates
Ohio's treatment of the law of employment termination in light of
developments in other jurisdictions and proposes alternatives for
Ohio. The fourth section examines the rationales underlying the
at-will presumption. The note concludes that the presumption of
just cause for discharge would establish a more equitable and
workable framework for the resolution of termination disputes and
would better serve both employer and employee interests.
I. THE HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL: ITS RISE, EROSION,
AND STUBBORN PERSISTENCE
A. The Rise of Employment at Will
Prior to the Industrial Revolution in England, the general
presumption was that employment would endure for a term of one
year unless otherwise specified." While this presumption may have
been the result of an attempt by the upper classes to control wages
and prices,9 the yearly presumption protected employees from be-
ing released during the off-seasons and effectively guaranteed em-
infra text accompanying note 65.
7. See infra p. 1240.
8. Prior to the Industrial Revolution in England, most employment situations cen-
tered around agricultural and domestic service relationships. Note, The State of At-Will
Employment in California After Foley, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.J. 393, 394 (1989); see P.
MANTOUX, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 145 (1928). The
rule applied to these situations was articulated by Blackstone:
"If the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law construes
it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant
shall serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the ... seasons; as
well as when there is work to be done as when there is not ....
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118,
120 (1976) (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 413,
425 (1765)).
9. See K. PALMER & J. COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 47-48 (6th
ed. 1983).
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ployers a labor force. 10
The Industrial Revolution marked the end of the one-year
term presumption." This presumption made less sense as employ-
ers needed the flexibility to respond to changes in the demand for
their product, fluctuations in the economy, and changes in tech-
nology.' 2 By the middle of the nineteenth century, the English
courts had adopted the rule that, absent an express contractual
provision, either party could terminate an employment relation-
ship upon reasonable notice. The American at-will approach rep-
resents both a departure from and a continuation of this English
rule."3 H. G. Wood gave the authoritative statement of the Ameri-
can rule:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite
hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to
make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish
it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no
time being specified, is an indefinite hiring . . . and is determi-
nable at the will of either party. 4
Despite its questionable underpinnings,' 5 Wood's Rule gener-
ally was accepted by courts in the United States.'" In Lochner v.
New York,' the Supreme Court declared that a state could not
10. Note, supra note 8, at 394; see Feinman, supra note 8, at 120 (tracing the his-
tory of the master-servant relationship and employment at will in the United States).
11. See P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 135 (1969) (discuss-
ing the evolution of the free labor market). Prior to the Industrial Revolution "[t]he legal
status of the master-servant relationship was viewed as essentially a domestic relationship
and, with the rise of industrialization, the status of the relationship evolved to one of 'em-
ployer and employee.'" Hill, Arbitration as a Means of Protecting Employees from Un-
just Dismissal: A Statutory Proposal, 3 N. ILL. U.L. RaV. 111, 113-15 (1982).
12. See Note, supra note 8, at 394.
13. See AMERICAN BAR AW5'N, 1982 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW COMMITTEE
REPORTS 15.
14. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (2d ed.
1886) (footnote omitted).
15. See Feinman, supra note 8, at 125-27 (calling Wood's Rule "a mere published,
ill-supported statement"); Note, supra note 8, at 395 & n.20 (noting modem criticism of
Wood).
16. See I C. LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 159
& n.2 (1913) (citing numerous cases in which Wood's Rule was recognized). "The prepon-
derance of American authority in favor of the doctrine that an indefinite hiring is presump-
tively a hiring at will is so great that it is scarcely open to criticism." Id. § 160. The
Supreme Court recognized the doctrine in dictum in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,
171-76 (1908) ("the right of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever
reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason to dispense with the
service of such employee").
17. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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interfere with the liberty of contract and infringe on "the freedom
of master and employee to contract with each other in relation to
their employment."' 8 But even during the Lochner era the rule
was not universally approved. 19
Some commentators have argued that the rule reflected the
expectations and needs of the employer and employees,20 while
others have described the at-will presumption as an expression of
the laissez-faire attitude of the late nineteenth century.2' Perhaps
a more suitable explanation of the spread of the at-will rule is that
it suited the needs of employers who desired more control over
their employees22 at a time when employee interests found little
sympathy in the courts. 3
B. The First Exceptions: Collective Bargaining and Anti-
Discrimination Legislation
Though the rule achieved universal adoption, the economic
crisis of the 1930s precipitated a general reexamination of em-
ployment relations. Congress realized that the gross "inequality of
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full free-
dom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers ' 24
18. Id. at 64.
19. One commentator argued:
[T]he higher the position to which the contract relates the more certainly may it
be inferred that the employer and employed expect their relationship to continue
for a considerable period. It seems questionable whether a doctrine resting on a
presumption which ignores that expectation as an element indicative of intention
can with propriety be treated as one of general application . . . . It is at least
fairly open to argument whether the more reasonable doctrine is not that which
treats the duration of the engagement as an entirely open question of fact, unen-
cumbered by any presumption whatsoever ....
1 C. LABATr, supra note 16, § 160. Williston also found it reasonable to presume that a
preset period of time is intended in higher position employment contracts. See I S. WILuis-
TON, CoNTRACTs § 39 (1921).
20. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 8.
21. See, e.g., P. SELZNICK, supra note 11, at 135-36; Hill, supra note 11, at 119.
22. See Feinman, supra note 8, at 131-35 (the rule allowed an employer to silence
employees by threatening immediate dismissal); Leonard, A New Common Law of Em-
ployment Termination, 66 N.C.L. REV. 631, 641 (1988) ("The rule also allowed employers
maximum freedom to upgrade their work, their work forces or lay off workers in times of
reduced need for production.").
23. See Leonard, supra note 22, at 641 n.61 ("[C]ollective labor action damaging to
an employer was subject to injunction, employees injured at work could not recover against
an employer if a fellow employee played any role in the accident, and legislative attempts
to ameliorate harsh working conditions were considered unconstitutional by the courts.").
24. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
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negated the presumption of contracting equality. Collective bar-
gaining was impossible where union membership and activities
were grounds for discharge. The Wagner Act's prohibitions on
"discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization" 25 marked the first limita-
tion on the employer's power to terminate at will.
The Wagner Act established protections for union activities
to ensure the viability of the collective bargaining process.2 6 The
Act guaranteed employees the right to organize and to bargain
collectively. It also required employers to bargain in good faith
with the union over wages, hours, and other conditions of employ-
ment.28 However, "employment at-will was . . . firmly embedded
in the common law."29 Under the Act neither party to the bar-
gaining process was required to agree to any proposal nor to make
any concession. 0 The Act merely ensured union recognition and
required good faith bargaining."1 Employees could secure protec-
tion from termination at will only through negotiations conducted
by their union.
Unions did win a "just cause" standard for termination
through the newly protected collective bargaining process. Gener-
ally, unions were able to secure collective bargaining agreements
that provided grievance and arbitration procedures. These proce-
dures necessarily ensured a measure of protection from employ-
ment at will. 32 Collective bargaining agreements, however, never
covered a majority of the work force. In 1946 union membership
25. Id. § 158(a)(3).
26. See generally J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC
PROCESSES. LAW AND PRACTICE 1-14 (1988)(Wagner Act focused "on eliminating barriers
to organization and requiring collective bargaining"); Summers, Labor Law as the Century
Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REv. 7, 7-9 (1988) (the inequality of bar-
gaining power would be remedied by creating a collective labor market).
27. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, §§ 7, 8(l), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1988)).
28. Id. §§ 8(5), 9(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a)
(1988)).
29. Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor Move-
ment, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1123, 1125 (1986).
30. This implicit assumption of the Wagner Act was made explicit by the Taft-Hart-
ley amendments. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 8(d), 61 Stat. 136, 142
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988)).
31. J. GEMAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 26, at 2.
32. See N. CHAMBERLAIN, D. CULLEN & D. LEWIN, THE LABOUR SECTOR 222-28
(3d ed. 1980)
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reached its peak, totaling thirty-five percent of nonagricultural
workers. 3 Present union membership has dropped to 16.4% of
nonagricultural workers. 4 Although unions have succeeded in
gaining just cause protection for their members, a growing major-
ity of the labor force is not collectively represented.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Congress passed remedial legis-
lation to create statutory exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine. Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 5 to prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.36 Congress passed
other statutory limitations on employment at will, including the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act;37 the Consumer Credit
Protection Act;38 the Occupational Safety and Health Act;3 9 and
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.40 These
statutes extended a narrow exception to the at-will doctrine to em-
ployees within the protected class.
This remedial legislation constituted a break with the na-
tional policy of relying on collective bargaining to regulate the la-
bor market.4' While these statutes may have narrowed the
breadth of the at-will doctrine to exclude the dismissal of employ-
ees within a protected class, these statutes did little to protect
other employees from an employer's power to dismiss at will. Em-
ployees who were not members of a class, or could not prove that
their termination was based on membership in such a class re-
mained unprotected from unjust discharge. One employee, be-
33. Id. at 124 (chart showing union participation). Another source marks 1953 as
the high point of union membership when approximately one third of the nonagricultural
workforce and about 25 % of the total civilian labor force were collectively represented. L.
TROY & N. SHEFUN, UNION SOURCEBOOK 1-1 (1985); see Summers, supra note 26, at 10.
34. Union Membership Down to 16.4 Percent of Workers in 1989, BLS Survey
Shows, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at B-8 (Feb. 8, 1990).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
36. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1988) (prohibiting termination based on indebtedness or gar-
nishment of wages).
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988) (prohibiting termination of employees who exercise
their rights under the Act and refuse to work under inordinately hazardous conditions).
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988) (prohibiting discharge for the purpose of
preventing employees from attaining vested pension rights).
41. See Summers, supra note 26, at 12.
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cause of membership in a protected class, may have some protec-
tion or administrative recourse from an employer's at-will
dismissal power, while the employee at the next work station has
no protection because of the lack of such membership.42 Similarly,
an employee fortunate enough to be covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement or civil service rules may enjoy greater protec-
tions than an employee doing the same work in a nonunion or non-
civil-service context.43
C. Judicial Exceptions that Prove the Rule
Although employment at will purports to grant unlimited dis-
cretion to terminate an employment relationship, courts in thirty-
nine states have limited the scope of an employer's power to dis-
miss. 44 The theories justifying these exceptions fall into three cate-
gories: (1) implied contract, (2) public policy, and (3) duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
1. Implied Contract
Courts in thirty-four states have recognized that employer
handbooks, policies, or other representations to the employees may
form an implied contract limiting the employer's right to termi-
nate its employees. 45 At one time, courts refused to imply such
limitations finding a lack of either independent consideration or
mutuality of obligation. Many courts no longer require mutuality
of obligation in order to incorporate the employer's promises into
the employment contract.46 Some courts have taken a more liberal
view of the independent consideration requirement, holding that
an employee's promise to render services,'7 beginning services for
the employer, 48 staying on the job,49 or the general benefit the em-
42. See Leonard, supra note 22, at 647.
43. See id.
44. See State Rulings Chart, supra note 6, at 505:51-52.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 464, 443 N.E.2d 441,
444, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 196 (1982); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich.
579, 600, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980).
47. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325-26, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 925 (1981) (employer's promise to a thirty-two-year employee that he would not be
discharged arbitrarily established an enforceable implied contract).
48. See id. at 325, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925; Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at
445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
49. See Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 302, 491 A.2d 1257, 1271
(1985).
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ployer gains from an "orderly, cooperative and loyal work force" 50
is sufficient consideration to render the employer's promises en-
forceable. Still others have held that if the employee is aware of
the manual and continues to work, the employment manual con-
stitutes an offer to form a binding unilateral contract.51
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,52 the Michigan
Supreme Court held that the enforceability of a contract depends
upon consideration and not mutuality of obligation.53 In Tous-
saint, two employees were told that they would not be discharged
as long as they did their job. One employee was given a personnel
manual stating that the company's policy was to dismiss employ-
ees only for just cause. Blue Cross argued that separate and dis-
tinct consideration was required to make the promise of just cause
within the manual enforceable. It also maintained that the con-
tract was unenforceable because of a lack of mutuality of
obligation.54
The court found that because the employer received an "or-
derly, cooperative and loyal work force" in return for his promise
of just cause there was sufficient consideration to make the prom-
ise a binding contract.55 The special circumstances of the em-
ployer's oral and written statements overcame the presumptive
construction that the contract was terminable at will. Toussaint
held that while an employer need not establish a just cause policy,
once the policy has been announced, the employer may not treat
its promise as illusory.56
However, Toussaint did provide a way for employers to cir-
cumvent its holding. The court noted that disclaimers requiring
prospective employees to acknowledge that they served at the will
or the pleasure of the company would have eliminated any em-
ployer liability.57 Employers could also make known to employees
50. Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
51. See Wooley, 99 N.J. at 302, 491 A.2d at 1267; Pine River State Bank v. Met-
tille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). Ohio courts have relied heavily on Pine River. See,
e.g., Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 472 N.E.2d 765 (1984).
52. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
53. Id. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
54. Id. at 599, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
55. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892. The court did not require a showing of reliance
by the employees on the policies in the manual. Id. at 613 n.25, 292 N.W.2d at 892 n.25.
56. Id. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 895.
57. Id. at 612, 292 N.W.2d at 891. Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453
(6th Cir. 1986), held that a signed disclaimer rendered company promises in an employ-
ment manual unenforceable. Sears required prospective employees to sign an application
1216 [Vol. 41:1209
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that personnel policies are subject to unilateral changes by the
employer. Employees then would have no legitimate expectation
that any particular policy would continue to remain in force.58
In re Certified Question59 required the Michigan Supreme
Court to decide whether an employer could unilaterally change a
written discharge-for-cause policy to at-will employment, even
though the right to make such a change was not expressly re-
served from the outset. The court reaffirmed the basic holding. of
Toussaint that employer statements of policy may give rise to
contractual obligations even without a showing that the employer
intended to be bound by such statements. The court noted, how-
ever, that Toussaint acknowledged the employer's right to make
unilateral changes in its personnel policies.60
[I]t is one thing to expect that a discharge-for-cause policy
will be uniformly applied while it is in effect; it is quite a differ-
ent proposition to expect that such a personnel policy, having no
fixed duration, will be immutable unless the right to revoke the
policy was expressly reserved.6"
Although an employee has a legitimate right to expect that
his or her employer will uniformly apply personnel policies in ef-
fect at any given time, such policies are not perpetually binding
contractual obligations.6 2 "In the modern economic climate, the
operating policies of a business enterprise must be adaptable and
responsive to change." ' The court required employers to give rea-
sonable notice of such changes to affected employees and prohib-
for employment that provided:
In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and regula-
tions of Sears, Roebuck and Co., and my employment and compensation can be
terminated with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time, at the
option of either the Company or myself. I understand that no store manager or
representative of Sears, Roebuck and Co., other than the president or vice presi-
dent of the Company, has any authority to enter into any agreement for employ-
ment for any specified period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the
foregoing.
Id. at 456. For additional cases upholding the Sears disclaimer, see Ringwelkski v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 636 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Summers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
549 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D.Mich. 1982); Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344
(E.D.Mich. 1980).
58. Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 895.
59. 432 Mich. 438, 443 N.W.2d 112 (1989).
60. Id. at 444-45, 443 N.W.2d at 115.
61. Id. at 455, 443 N.W.2d at 120.
62. Id. at 455-56, 443 N.W.2d at 120.
63. Id. at 456, 443 N.W.2d at 120.
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ited changes made in bad faith.64
2. Public Policy
Courts in thirty-nine states have recognized causes of action
in either tort or contract where an employer discharges an em-
ployee in violation of a public policy.6 5 These decisions generally
have rested on the rationale that legislative goals and general so-
cial policies would be frustrated if employers could discharge em-
ployees for certain "bad reasons. 6 Courts have recognized public
policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine where em-
ployers have discharged employees for refusing to commit a
crime,6 7 serving on a jury,6 8 "blowing the whistle" on employer
wrongdoing,6" filing a workers' compensation claim,7 0 and refusing
to violate a code of ethics.7 1
Sources of public policy have included statutes,7 2 constitu-
tions,73 administrative regulations or decisions,7 4 and even profes-
sional codes of ethics.7 5 Generally, courts have recognized only
those public policies that were "clear[ly] mandate[d] ,' "7 "well-ac-
cepted," 77 or that "stem either from a constitutional or statutorily
guaranteed right.178
64. Id. at 457, 443 N.W.2d at 120.
65. See State Rulings Chart, supra note 6, at 505:51-52 (list of exceptions to em-
ployment at will in various states).
66. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 189, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959).
67. See, e.g., id.; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
68. E.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
69. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385
(1980); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
"An employee should not be put to an election whether to risk criminal sanction or to
jeopardize his continued employment." Sheets, 179 Conn. at 480, 427 A.2d at 389.
70. E.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
71. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72-73, 417 A.2d
505, 512-13 (1980).
72. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973).
73. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
74. See, e.g., Nye v. Department of Livestock, 196 Mont. 222, 639 P.2d 498 (1982).
75. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
76. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
77. Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 367, 353 N.W.2d 469, 474
(1984) (Williams, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting); accord Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d
894, 899 (3d Cir. 1983).
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The public policy exception to the at-will doctrine has
spawned both contractual and tort remedies. Where the court's
primary purpose has been to make the wronged employee whole,
the remedy has been limited to contractual damages such as rein-
statement and backpay 9 Punitivp damages have been awarded in
tort actions where the court found it imperative to deter future
employer conduct that might frustrate important social policies.80
The case for a public policy exception is the strongest where
an employee is discharged for refusing to commit a crime.8" The
public policy exception is more problematic, however, when the
employer's conduct is not as outrageous, when the source of the
public policy is not so clear, or when the employer's particular
conduct is more common.
The number of employees covered by the public policy excep-
tion is quite small. While this exception covers some of the most
egregious cases of wrongful discharge, it fails to touch the vast
majority of wrongful discharges. 82 Courts have been reluctant to
embrace a public policy exception to include an essentially private
dispute that only remotely implicates a public concern.8 3
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The most controversial and least recognized exception to em-
ployment at will is the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.84 While the courts are not in agreement as to whether
this exception to the at-will doctrine arises out of a contractual
right or by operation of law the implied covenant exception, like
the public policy exception, raises the possibility of punitive dam-
ages for wrongful discharge.8 5 Unlike the public policy exception,
however, the covenant has the potential for widespread application
79. See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 561, 575, 335
N.W.2d 834, 841 (1983) ("In contract actions, damages are limited by the concepts of
foreseeability and mitigation.").
80. E.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512
(1980).
81. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
82. See Summers, supra note 26, at 60.
83. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (limited circumstances in which
court will impose public policy exception).
84. Only twelve states recognize this exception to the at-will doctrine. For changes
made in bad faith, see State Rulings Chart, supra note 6, at 505:51-52 (list of exceptions
to employment at will, by state).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 94-126.
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to private employment disputes that do not directly implicate pub-
lic concerns.
The first recognition of the implied covenant exception to the
at-will doctrine came in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,88 where a
female machine operator was fired for refusing to date her fore-
man. The plaintiff in Monge brought an assumpsit action to re-
cover damages for the breach of her employment contract. After
weighing the employer's interest in running the business, the em-
ployee's interest in maintaining her employment, and the public's
interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two, the
court held that "a termination by the employer of a contract of
employment at-will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or
based on retaliation is not [sic] the best interest of the economic
system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employ-
ment contract.
'87
In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,88 the court refused
to read the implied covenant as broadly as the Monge court did
but, nevertheless, found that the employer had violated an implied
covenant. The employer dismissed a salesman in order to avoid
paying certain bonuses.8" The court observed that good faith and
fair dealing has been assumed or implied in a variety of contract
cases, and expressly recognized by the Uniform Commercial Code
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts."0
The Fortune court reasoned:
[T]he holding in the Monge case merely extends to employment
contracts the rule that "'in every contract there is an implied
covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have
the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every con-
tract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair
86. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
87. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. While the court noted that "[t]he employer has long
ruled the workplace with an iron hand .... [t]he law governing the relations between
employer and employee has . . . evolved to reflect changing legal, social and economic
conditions." Id. at 132, 316 A.2d at 551 (citations omitted). The court held that its new
rule "afford[s] the employee a certain stability of employment and does not interfere with
the employer's normal exercise of his right to discharge, which is necessary to permit him
to operate his business efficiently and profitably." Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 552.
88. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
89. Id. at 98-99, 364 N.E.2d at 1254.
90. Id. at 103, 364 N.E.2d at 1256-57 (citing examples of insurance contracts, col-
lective bargaining agreements, secondary agreements to a stock option agreement, and con-
tracts to be performed to the satisfaction of another party as well as U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989)
and RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 (1979)).
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dealing.' "I1
The court found that the termination of a twenty-five-year
employee to avoid paying a substantial sales bonus was evidence
of bad faith on the part of the employer, which had the employee
"'at its mercy.' ",92 A company's right to control its own
workforce and flexibility in decision making would not be unduly
hampered by adherence to a standard of good faith.93
Both Monge and Fortune viewed the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing as rooted in contract; compensatory damages
were available for the machine operator's lost wages and the sales-
man's lost bonus. Monge specifically disallowed recovery for
mental suffering since such damages are generally not recoverable
in a contract action.94 In Fortune the issue of punitive damages
did not arise because the plaintiff sought only the bonus provided
for in the contract.95
In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,96 the court held that the
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounded in
both tort and contract. The court reasoned that the concept of
good faith and fair dealing first formulated by California courts in
insurance contracts could also be applied to employment con-
tracts.97 The plaintiff employee had been fired by his employer for
his union organizing activities. The Cleary court relied on the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court's decision in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co.,9" which created a public policy exception to the at-will doc-
.trine, recognized causes of action in both contract and tort, and
provided for punitive as well as compensatory damages. 99 The
Cleary court held that the plaintiff had a cause of action for
wrongful discharge. 100 The court also acknowledged that there
was substantial authority to support a cause of action in tort for
breach of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.101 The court found that the plaintiff's eighteen years of ser-
91. Id. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 105, 364 N.E.2d at 1258 (quoting Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass.
234, 243, 316 N.E.2d 748, 755 (1974)).
93. Id.
94. Monge, 114 N.H. at 134, 316 A.2d at 552.
95. Fortune, 373 Mass. at 101 n.7, 364 N.E.2d at 1255 n.7.
96. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
97. Id. at 454, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
98. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
99. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
100. Cleary, 11 Cal. App. 3d at 454-55, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
101. Id. at 454, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27
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vice to the company made his termination without cause a breach
of the implied-in-law covenant.102 It also determined that the com-
pany's explicit policies for discharge indicated the employer's rec-
ognition of its own duty to refrain from arbitrary conduct towards
its employees. The length of service and explicit policies operated
as a form of estoppel, precluding discharge of the employee with-
out good cause.'0 Because this cause of action sounded in both
tort and contract, Cleary would be entitled to compensatory dam-
ages and, if his proof were sufficient, punitive damages.104
While Cleary was only an appellate decision, it was the first
in a line of cases that recognized a cause of action in tort for
breach of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing in California. 0 5 The California Supreme Court, however, re-
jected the tort cause of action in Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp.0 6 In a four-to-three decision; the court held that a cause of
action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
would only be recognized in contract.
In Foley, a branch manager was fired for reporting to his em-
ployer that his immediate supervisor was under investigation by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation for embezzlement. 0 7 The
court found that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for
breach of an implied-in-fact contract limiting the employer's right
to discharge employees arbitrarily. 08 Although the court was will-
ing to apply the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, it held
that breach would only give rise to contract damages.0 9
The California Supreme Court stated that damages for
breach of contract traditionally have been awarded to compensate
the aggrieved party, not to punish the breaching party."10 The
Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980)).
102. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1988); Koehrer v.
Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986); Gray v. Superior
Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1986); Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170
Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985); Rulon-Miller v. International Business
Mach. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo
Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984); Crosier v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983).
106. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
107. Id. at 664, 765 P.2d at 375-76, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
108. Id. at 682, 765 P.2d at 388, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
109. Id. at 700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
110. Id. at 683, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
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court noted that the covenant is a contract term and compensation
for its breach has almost always been limited to contract rather
than tort remedies."" The court found that the clear majority of
jurisdictions had rejected tort damages for breach of the implied
covenant in employment cases or had rejected the application of
the covenant in such cases altogether." 2 The Foley court held that
Cleary had erred in its reliance on the insurance analogy because,
unlike wronged insureds, employees can and must mitigate their
damages by attempting to find other employment. 1 3 The em-
ployee's situation is more analogous to that of a commercial con-
tract than it is analogous to an insurance contract, the court rea-
soned, as insurance contracts provide a public service in the form
of protection from potential harm."' In addition, the economic
conflict between the employer and employee is far less than that
between the insurer and insured. The need to place disincentives
on the employer's conduct, therefore, would not justify the imposi-
tion of tort liability."H5 The court expressed concern about the po-
tentially enormous consequences that the expansion of tort liabil-
ity would have on the stability of the business community."16
Though contract damages might prove to be inadequate, the court
held that such problems are best left to the legislature.",7
The dissent in Foley argued that the employment relationship
was in fact analogous to the relationship between an insurer and
an insured, because the public interest at stake is at least as im-
portant, and in many cases the worker may not be able to mitigate
damages by finding other employment." 8 There is a genuine con-
cern that some employers and insurers will act arbitrarily unless
threatened with damages that, unlike traditional contract dam-
ages, exceed the short-term profit of the arbitrary conduct." 9 The
dissent argued that neither insurance contracts nor employment
contracts are entered into for commercial advantage but rather
111. Id. at 684, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
112. Id. at 686, 765 P.2d at 391, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
113. Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
116. Id. at 699, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
117. Id. at 700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
118. Id. at 708, 765 P.2d at 407, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 245 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
119. Id. at 707, 765 P.2d at 407, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 245 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
12231991]
1224 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1209
are entered into to provide basic financial security.120 The tort
remedy arises from "society's right to deter and demand redress
for arbitrary or malicious conduct which inflicts harm on one of
its members."' 2'
As in Cleary, the Montana Supreme Court in Gates v. Life
of Montana Insurance Co.'22 found employment contracts to be
analogous to insurance contracts and allowed punitive damages
for bad faith employer practices. 2 s In Gates, the employee hand-
book entitled employees to a warning before dismissal for poor job
performance. A cashier was told, in contravention of the hand-
book, to resign or face termination for poor performance. The
plaintiff cashier charged that the employer forced her to resign in
order to avoid liability for unemployment compensation and pen-
sion benefits. When the plaintiff withdrew her resignation, she was
dismissed. 24
The Gates court held that the employer had breached the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court held that
the breach of the covenant was not an obligation arising out of the
employment contract but an obligation imposed by law. The
120. Id. at 709, 765 P.2d at 407-08, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 246 (Broussard, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
The principal reason we permit tort damages for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in an insurance contract is that persons do not generally
purchase insurance to obtain a commercial advantage, but to secure the peace of
mind and security it will provide in protecting against accidental loss. That rea-
son applies equally to the employer-employee relationship . . . .A [worker]
usually does not enter into employment solely for the money; a job is status,
reputation, a way of defining one's self-worth in the community. It is also essen-
tial to financial security, offering assurance of future income needed to repay
present debts and meet future obligations. Without a secure job a worker fre-
quently cannot obtain a retirement pension, and often lacks access to affordable
medical insurance.
Id. (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 711, 765 P.2d at 409, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 247 (Broussard, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
122. 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983).
123. Id. at 306-07, 668 P.2d at 214.
124. The court previously had followed Monge and Fortune in finding that a cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing was implied in plaintiff's employment contract. Gates v.
Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 184, 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1982). Although it
did not hold that such a covenant was necessarily present in all employment contracts, it
found that the defendant's policies of uniform termination procedures gave rise to such a
covenant here. The case was remanded for jury determination of whether the employer's
action constituted a breach of that covenant. The jury found a breach of the covenant and
awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The case was then appealed back up to the
Montana Supreme Court.
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breach of the covenant therefore sounded in tort, and punitive
damages would be available if the defendant's conduct were suffi-
ciently culpable. 125 The Gates court cautioned that "[t]he courts
must vigilantly assure that employers, as well as employees, are
treated fairly. The sting of punitive damages will only be sanc-
tioned where there is evidence that the tort feasor's [sic] conduct
rose to the level of oppression, fraud, or malice. '126
While the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has poten-
tial for widespread application to employment disputes, very few
jurisdictions have recognized this exception to the at-will doctrine.
Even in those jurisdictions that initially recognized this exception
to the at-will doctrine, the implied covenant has been subjected to
judicial limits and even legislative repeal. Monge was subse-
quently limited to situations where the employee was discharged
in violation of public policy.121 Foley limited recovery under the
covenant to contract damages.128 In Montana, the legislature over-
ruled Gates by passing the nation's only wrongful discharge
statute. 29
II. THE RESPONSE OF OHIO TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. General At-Will Policy
Ohio has adopted the at-will doctrine in much the same man-
ner as other jurisdictions. °30 In one of the earliest reported em-
ployment cases, Bascom v. Shillito,"'3 the Ohio Supreme Court
showed its reluctance to adhere to the English rule.13 2 By 1923
125. Gates, 205 Mont. at 307, 668 P.2d at 215. The Montana Code provided for
punitive damages for all malicious breaches of noncontractual obligations. "In any action
for a breach of obligation not arising from contract where the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addition to the actual dam-
ages, may give damage for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant."
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1991), cited in Gates, 205 Mont. at 307, 668 P.2d at 214.
Section 27-2-221 was amended in 1987 but retains the same content.
126. 205 Mont. at 310-11, 668 P.2d at 216.
127. "We construe Mange to apply only to a situation where an employee is dis-
charged because he performed an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do
that which public policy would condemn." Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295,
296, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1980).
128. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 700, 765 P.2d 373, 401, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211, 239-40 (1988).
129. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1991).
130. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
131. 37 Ohio St. 431 (1882).
132. The Court noted that "[t]he rule, that from the mere fact that a servant has
been hired, the law will presume an employment for a year, is by no means inflexible even
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Wood's Rule and the at-will doctrine were firmly established as
the law of employment termination in Ohio. 133
B. Implied Contract Theory and Promissory Estoppel
While continuing to reject good cause as a general require-
ment for discharge, by 1982 Ohio courts had begun to recognize
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine based on implied
contract and promissory estoppel. In Hedrick v. Center for Com-
prehensive Alcoholism Treatment, a4 representations in an em-
ployee handbook were found to provide the basis for a breach of
employment contract claim. 35 Despite the fact that the contract
was for a term of indefinite duration, the at-will presumption was
rebutted by the employer's representations in the handbook. 3 a
The court reasserted the basic contract principle that the parties'
intentions govern the construction of a contract. 137 The Hedrick
court also held that promissory estoppel was applicable to employ-
ment contracts.' 8 In so doing, however, the court cited only a
1925 Ohio Supreme Court case that quoted Corpus Juris.l39
Subsequent Ohio court decisions, however, have relied on au-
thority from other jurisdictions. In Day v. Good Samaritan Hos-
pital,140 the court considered whether employment manuals were
enforceable as terms of the employment contract. Not only did the
Day court refer to the holdings in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield,'4' Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,4 z and Weiner v. Mc-
in England, and perhaps a hiring for a shorter period will be more readily inferred in this
country than in England." Id. at 433.
133. "The employment, then, was not an employment for a specified term. [I]t was a
contract which could be terminated not merely by mutual consent, but at the wish of either
one of the parties . . . .[Such] employment was, in other words, an employment at will."
La France Elec. Constr. & Supply Co. v. I.B.E.W., Local No. 8, 108 Ohio St. 61, 140
N.E. 899 (1923).
134. 7 Ohio App. 3d 211, 454 N.E.2d 1343 (1982).
135. Id. at 214, 454 N.E.2d at 1347.
136. Id. at 213, 454 N.E.2d at 1346.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 214, 454 N.E.2d at 1347.
139. See id. (citing London & Lancashire Indem. Co. v. Fairbanks Steam Shovel
Co., 112 Ohio St. 136, 152, 147 N.E. 329, 334 (1925) (quoting 21 C.J. Estoppel § 116
(1920))).
140. No. 8062, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS (Aug. 17, 1983). Day was never published
despite its breadth of analysis and influence on Ohio employment law.
141. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
142. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
1226 [Vol. 41:1209
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
Graw-Hill, Inc.,43 it also quoted extensively from Pine River
State Bank v. Mettille."' In Pine River, the court held an em-
ployment manual to be an offer for a unilateral contract. By stay-
ing on the job, the employee both accepts the offer and provides
adequate consideration. The unilateral contract then replaces the
original at-will contract.14 5 The Day court adopted the Pine River
unilateral contract analysis and held that the procedures and poli-
cies in the employer's manual were enforceable as terms of the
employment contract.1 46
Day found that the hospital's employment manual created a
unilateral contract enforceable at law and that the employee could
only be discharged in accordance with the manual's procedures
and its good cause provision. The court held that the employer
derived the benefit of management flexibility with the assurance
of an efficient and faithful source of personnel. 47 But the Day
court noted that if the employer did not intend the manual to be
binding, it need only state that the manual is of no legal
significance.148
In Jones v. East Center for Community Health,149 the court
refused to find that an employer's personnel manual constituted
an enforceable contract, but nevertheless, enforced the promises
contained within the manual under the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel. 5 ' In Jones a discharged employee maintained that the em-
ployment manual constituted an enforceable contract and required
just cause for discharge. Jones followed Hedrick in holding that
although an employment relationship is terminable at will, the
parties are not prevented from entering into a contract that pro-
vides otherwise."5" The court examined the circumstances in light
143. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
144. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
145. Id. at 627. The Pine River court noted that the offer of a unilateral contract in
a personnel handbook might be the employer's response to the practical problem of the
transaction costs that would accrue if the employer wrote a separate contract with each
employee. Id. Moreover, the court noted that the requirement of mutuality of obligation
"although appealing in its symmetry, is simply a species of the forbidden inquiry into the
adequacy of consideration, an inquiry in which this court has, by and large, refused to
engage." Id. at 629.
146. Day, No. 8062, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS at 24-30.
147. Id.
148. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 45-64 (discussing the limits of the
implied contract exception to the at-will doctrine).
149. 19 Ohio App. 3d 19, 482 N.E.2d 969 (1984).
150. Id. at 23, 482 N.E.2d at 974.
151. Id. at 20-21, 482 N.E.2d at 971-72.
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of traditional contract principles and found consideration and mu-
tuality of obligation to be lacking. 152 Not only had the defendant
not requested any benefit in exchange for the promises in the
manual, the plaintiff did not suffer, nor did the defendant expect
the plaintiff to suffer, any legal detriment.1 53 Moreover, because
the plaintiff had not given anything in return for the promises in
the manual, the court held that the agreement lacked mutuality of
obligation.154
The court, however, enforced the promises in the manual
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.15 5 The court noted that
Toussaint established that an employer reaped benefits from its
promise of just cause.""6 Although the court did not follow Tous-
saint in finding that the benefits constituted sufficient considera-
tion for the promise, the Jones court did find that the employer's
benefit was evidence that it had induced action or forbearance on
the part of the employee in reliance on those promises157
Then-Judge Douglas concurred in the judgment but, in addi-
tion to invoking promissory estoppel, found an enforceable con-
tract. Judge Douglas urged the court to adopt the holding in
Toussaint and find consideration in the benefits the employer
gained from its promises. Douglas wanted the case to be certified
to the Ohio Supreme Court because "[t]he importance of the is-
sues involved and the uncertain nature of the current law in this
area cry out for a guiding light."1 '
152. Id. at 22, 482 N.E.2d at 973.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Jones, 19 Ohio App. 3d at 23, 482 N.E.2d at 974. The court cited Talley v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No. 377, 48 Ohio St. 2d 142, 146, 357 N.E.2d 44,
47 (1976), and quoted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
156. Id. at 23, 482 N.E.2d at 974.
157. Id. at 23-24, 482 N.E.2d at 974. The court noted that the remedy may be
limited as justice requires. Id. at 24, 482 N.E.2d at 974.
158. Id. at 24-25, 482 N.E.2d at 975 (Douglas, J., concurring). Douglas also
observed:
Considering the employment-at-will doctrine, I am constrained to view the same
as an anachronism in today's peripatetic society. Prospective employees often
travel great distances and make substantial sacrifices in response to employers'
offers of employment opportunities. In most instances, the employer endeavors to
make itself attractive to the prospective employee and, understandably, the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine remains unmentioned and is often unknown to both
parties. In order to maintain an efficient and loyal work force, the employer
usually finds it necessary to establish personnel policies and to consistently and
fairly administer the same. Personnel policies and employment manuals typically
become an inextricable part of the employment relationship and are relied upon
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Two months later, the same appellate court decided Helle v.
Landmark, Inc. 5 9 In Helle the court explicitly stated that con-
temporary contract theory would also apply to termination cases
involving severance pay.160 Although freedom of contract has been
used to justify the at-will doctrine, 161 the Helle court invoked it to
limit the doctrine. It bemoaned the fact that freedom of contract
was being "circumscribed by an asphyxiative construction of the
'at-will' doctrine." 62
The court found that remaining on the job and continued per-
formance provided sufficient consideration by the employee to
render the employer's promises of severance pay enforceable.'6 3
While recognizing that an employer's disclaimer could forestall
claims of legitimate expectations, the court held that an em-
ployer's representations could negate the effect of such disclaim-
ers. 64 Because the court found a binding unilateral contract, the
issue of promissory estoppel was held to be moot. 6 5
Once again, Judge Douglas wrote a concurring opinion. He
agreed that disclaimers can preclude claims of reliance on em-
ployer promises.'68 Absent such a disclaimer, however, fundamen-
both by the employer and the employee to their mutual benefit. Consideration
flows in both directions in such a situation as the policies bring order and pre-
dictability to the workplace and greatly benefit both parties.
Id. at 24, 482 N.E.2d at 974 (Douglas, J., concurring).
159. 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 472 N.E.2d 765 (1984).
160. Id. at 7, 472 N.E.2d at 772.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 8-23.
162. Helle, 15 Ohio App. 3d at 7, 472 N.E.2d at 772.
163. Id. at 10-11, 472 N.E.2d at 775.
164. Id. at 10, 472 N.E.2d at 775.
165. Id. at 13, 472 N.E.2d at 777.
166. Specifically, Judge Douglas contended:
[I]n addition to the clear contract question, I believe, further, that the employee-
at-will doctrine is an issue in this case. This archaic and rapidly disappearing
doctrine (applied as an absolute) needs further example of why that is so. The
doctrine has long been used to terminate employees (who are without protection
pursuant to a firm contract of employment and/or union protection through a
collective bargaining agreement) summarily, notwithstanding reliance by an em-
ployee upon assurances of employment, either verbally or through employment
manuals rising to the level of contract. Obviously, when just cause exists, the
employee's employment can be summarily terminated. Likewise, if an employee
is told upon employment that his or her services can be terminated with or with-
out reason, notice or cause, than at least such employee can be "here today and
gone tomorrow." When such is not delineated at the onset of the employment
relationship, then it would appear that other matters, including the doctrine of
fundamental fairness, should be considered.
Id. at 13-14, 472 N.E.2d at 778 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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tal fairness requires that employer induced reliance be held to es-
tablish a binding employment contract.167 Moreover, Douglas did
not agree that the claim of promissory estoppel was moot.168
In 1985 Judge Douglas was elected to the Ohio Supreme
Court. In Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co.," 9 the Ohio Supreme
Court, driven by the conflict between Justice Douglas's 70 views
and the tradition of employment at will, reached an uneasy com-
promise. Mers was suspended from his job as a traveling represen-
tative pending resolution of criminal charges against him. When
the charges were subsequently dismissed, he was terminated. Mers
sought relief on breach of contract and promissory estoppel theo-
ries, based on several facts including his good employment record,
various oral promises made to him by the employer at the time of
hiring, suspension and dismissal of the criminal charges, provi-
sions in the employer's handbook, and the employer's failure to
follow its own published procedures.' 7'
The court noted that while Ohio had long recognized the
right of the employer to discharge employees at will, 172 this right
was limited by both state and federal legislation against various
types of employment discrimination.73 The court cautioned, how-
ever, that the employment-at-will doctrine should not be totally
abolished, however, since this would place the courts in the posi-
tion of second guessing the business judgment of employers. 174
The need for certainty and continuity in the law required the
court to stand by precedent.
Although the court would not recognize a blanket "just
cause" requirement, 75 it did recognize two narrow exceptions to
167. Id. at 14, 472 N.E.2d at 778 (Douglas, J., concurring).
168. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
169. 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
170. Douglas was elected to the Ohio Supreme Court in 1985.
171. Mers, 19 Ohio St. 3d at 101, 483 N.E.2d at 152.
172. Id. at 103, 483 N.E.2d at 153. Mers also expressly held that there would be no
exception to the at-will doctrine for malicious acts nor any implied duty on the parties to
act in good faith. The court went on to note that Ohio did not recognize a duty of good
faith and fair dealing. Id. at 105, 483 N.E.2d at 155. For a discussion of duty of the good
faith and fair dealing, see infra text accompanying notes 84-129.
173. Mers, 19 Ohio St. 3d at 103, 483 N.E.2d at 153.
174. Id.
175. One commentator has suggested that the Mers court initially had decided to
overrule Fawcett, which upheld the employment-at-will doctrine:
In the official opinion document released by the Supreme Court on August 9,
1985, following the review of Fawcett, there is a twenty-four line gap. After the
gap, the opinion states in a new paragraph: "Having come a full circle in our
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the at-will doctrine.1 76 Employee handbooks, company policy, and
oral representations might, in some situations, provide evidence
from which an implied contract altering the terms of discharge
might be inferred. 1 7 The court also held that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel is applicable to oral employment-at-will
agreements.1  The test in such cases is whether the employer
should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied
upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or
forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the
employee.1 79
Between the expansive view of coitract and consideration set
forth in Toussaint and the absolutist view of employment at will,
the court chose vague notions of implied contract and promissory
estoppel. In separate opinions, Justice Holmes and Justice Doug-
las defined the two poles. Justice Holmes wrote for the absolutist
tradition declaring that "[t]he law of Ohio is well documented in
support of the principle that employment is presumed to be at-will
unless other contractual provisions expressly or impliedly provide
otherwise."''8 0 For Justice Holmes, rebuttal of the at-will pre-
sumption would be a difficult test.' 1"
Justice Douglas welcomed the move from "slavish adherence
discussion of the at-will employment doctrine, we now arrive at the essential
question of whether the trial court improperly sustained appellees' motion for
summary judgment." Despite this language, the opinion never discussed employ-
ment-at-will. It discussed promissory estoppel and led into a twenty-four line gap
with a mention of Fawcett, which bore no relationship to the path of the Mers
analysis. It is submitted that Fawcett was originally to be overruled, but that
this section was deleted from the opinion before release.
Note, The Case for Keeping Employment-At-Will: An Analysis of Ohio's Position and the
Use of Disclaimers to Avoid Wrongful Discharge Litigation, 16 CAP. U.L. REv. 723, 736
(1987). The author quoted an attorney involved in the case and an unnamed supreme court
justice as agreeing that the court initially had decided to recognize a requirement of good
faith and fair dealing. Id. at 736 n.109.
176. Mers, 19 Ohio St. 3d at 103, 483 N.E.2d at 154.
177. Id. at 103-104, 483 N.E.2d at 154. The court listed several factors that could
contribute to a finding of an exception:
the facts and circumstances surrounding an' oral employment-at-will agreement,
including the character of the employment, custom, the course of dealing be-
tween the parties, company policy, or any other fact which may illuminate the
question, can be considered by the trier of fact in order to determine the agree-
ment's explicit and implicit terms concerning the discharge.
Id. at 104, 483 N.E.2d at 154.
178. Id. at 108, 483 N.E.2d at 155.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 106-07, 483 N.E.2d at 156 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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to the principles [of employment at will] enunciated in Fawcett,
• . . which case on its face is unfair, toward a recognition that
there are and should be exceptions to the antiquated and discred-
ited employment-at-will doctrine."' 82 Justice Douglas hoped that
the "courageous first step" of Mers would be followed by consid-
eration of "other challenges to the employment-at-will doctrine, as
have a multitude of other enlightened jurisdictions, based on pub-
lic-policy considerations, contract principles, and/or tort theories,
where unfair and unjust violations of the employment relationship
have occurred."'' 8 3
The court struck an uneasy compromise position in Mers. In
order to avoid the modern contract remedy of Toussaint, the court
posited an amorphous mix of implied contract and promissory es-
toppel. The court supplied no substantive direction to the appel-
late courts. It left unanswered a host of questions concerning con-
sideration, intent, disclaimers, and detrimental reliance. After
Mers the appellate courts continued to decide wrongful discharge
cases utilizing a variety of inconsistent theories. 184
Four years later in Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing,
Inc.,'8 5 the Ohio Supreme Court revisited the question of promis-
sory estoppel. The court issued a narrow ruling that a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether the employer had
made specific promises to the plaintiff, Helmick, on which she had
detrimentally relied.' Helmick decided to discontinue her search
for another job on the basis of her employer's promise of a career
with the company as long as her job performance was satisfac-
tory."8 7 While the court stated that this particular set of facts
could establish detrimental reliance, it proposed no general test
that could be easily applied. Thus, the court failed to define the
standards for detrimental reliance.
Justices Douglas and Holmes again wrote separate opinions,
essentially repeating their arguments in Mers. In dissent, Justice
Holmes advocated the at-will doctrine, 88 while Justice Douglas
182. Id. at 106, 483 N.E.2d at 156 (Douglas, J., concurring).
183. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
184. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 198-218.
185. 45 Ohio St. 3d 131, 543 N.E.2d 1212 (1989).
186. Id. at 136, 543 N.E.2d at 1217.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 139, 491 N.E.2d at 1219-20 (Holmes, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); see supra text accompanying notes 241-42. Holmes added that "[tihis court
has preserved the doctrine of employment-at-will for sound public policy reasons" but de-
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waited for the day when the court would progress beyond promis-
sory estoppel."' 9 Douglas was looking to the expansion of the at-
will exceptions when he stated:
While in the case now before us the court applies Mers to a
new situation, it drags along the outdated absolutist position ex-
emplified in Fawcett and Phung. I eagerly await the time when
this court tosses away the view that a party has the right to
violate with malice aforethought the rights of others. Since this
court does not tolerate this type of behavior in any other area of
the law, we should likewise not condone gross disregard of the
rights of employees in the employment area.19°
Three weeks after Helmick, in Worrell v. Multipress, Inc.,191
the court took up the question of remedies for the breach of an
employment contract. In Worrell a corporate president was fired
in spite of a promise by the owner that the president would have a
position as long as he performed satisfactorily. The validity of the
finding of wrongful discharge was not appealed. The main issue on
appeal was the damage award. The court held that an employee
who had been wrongfully discharged as a result of a breach of an
employment contract may be awarded front pay as compensation
for lost future wages between the date of discharge and reemploy-
ment in a position of equal or similar status.192 Unlike Mers and
Helmick, the court in Worrell went on to define the factors to be
considered in determining front pay damages: (1) the age of the
employee and his or her reasonable prospects of obtaining compa-
rable employment elsewhere; (2) salary and other tangible bene-
fits, such as bonuses and vacation pay; (3) expenses associated
with finding new employment; and (4) the replacement value of
fringe benefits, such as automobile and insurance for a reasonable
time until new employment is obtained. 93
In Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,194 the court further at-
tempted to clarify the meaning of Mers. In Kelly, a sales repre-
dined to specify those reasons. Id. at 139, 543 N.E.2d at 1219 (Holmes, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Ironically, although Douglas had previously stated that the
supreme court should provide guidance in such cases, it is Holmes who attempted some
further definition of detrimental reliance. Id. at, 140, 543 N.E.2d at 1220 (Holmes, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Id. at 137, 543 N.E.2d at 1218 (Douglas, J., concurring).
190. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
191. 45 Ohio St. 3d 241, 543 N.E.2d 1277 (1989).
192. Id. at 247, 543 N.E.2d at 1283.
193. Id.
194. 46 Ohio St. 3d 134, 545 N.E.2d 1244 (1989).
12331991]
1234 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1209
sentative was fired after his company was acquired by Georgia-
Pacific. Kelly maintained that representations made to him in per-
formance reviews, discussions regarding the employee manual,
and correspondence from management officials created an implied
contract for continued employment conditional upon his accept-
able job performance. He further claimed that he relied on these
representations in forebearing from seeking alternative employ-
ment. 195 The court held that these questions could not be resolved
on summary judgment. It stated that these questions, as noted in
Mers, were for a jury to decide."9 6 The court indicated that Mers
was to be read broadly in determining whether a modification of
the at-will contract may be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances.""
Though recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions have begun to
broaden the use of implied contract and promissory estoppel theo-
ries, the effect of these decisions on the appellate courts cannot be
assumed. In the last few years appellate decisions in wrongful dis-
charge cases have been thoroughly inconsistent. 9 All opinions be-
gin with the Mers list of factors to be considered 99 but utilize a
wide range of theories to justify disparate results.
Under one line of case, some courts have followed the tradi-
tional at-will doctrine.200 These courts are reluctant to enforce
195. Id. at 140, 545 N.E.2d at 1250.
196. Id.
197. The Kelly court quoted Mers: "'[T]he character of the employment, custom,
the course of dealing between the parties, or other facts which may throw light upon the
question' can be considered by the jury in order to determine the parties' intent." Id. at
139, 545 N.E.2d at 1249 (quoting Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 104,
483 N.E.2d 150, 154 (1985)).
198. One court complained that:
Rather than clearing the air and establishing plain guidelines for both em-
ployers and employees on issues surrounding employment-at-will, Mers. . . and
Phung. . . have spawned a plethora of cases leading to numerous, often incon-
sistent cases from courts of appeals .... Briefs have become enlarged by the
attachment of unreported cases arguably supportive of each party's perspective.
Parsons v. Denny's Restaurants, No. CA-2608, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 5109, at 9 (Dee. 9,
1988), reh'g denied, 46 Ohio St. 3d 717, 546 N.E.2d 1335 (1989).
199. Mers established:
A priori, the facts and circumstances surrounding an oral employment-at-will
agreement, including the character of the employment, custom, the course of
dealing between the parties, company policy, or any other fact which may illu-
minate the question, can be considered by the trier of fact in order to determine
the agreement's explicit and implicit terms concerning discharge.
19 Ohio St. 3d at 104, 483 N.E.2d at 154.
200. See Brandenburger v. Hilti, Inc., 52 Ohio App. 3d 21, 24-25, 556 N.E.2d 212,
216-17 (1989); Uebelacker v. Cincom Sys., 48 Ohio App. 3d 268, 271, 549 N.E.2d 1210,
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vague assurances of continued employment 201 and generally hold
that a handbook alone is not sufficient to create a contract. 0 2 Oral
or written modifications to an original employment agreement
must be accompanied by the fundamental elements of contract
formation-offer, acceptance, and consideration. 0 3 Without this
mutual assent or a clearer expression of the requisite intent of the
parties to be bound, an employer's handbook is viewed as merely a
unilateral statement of employer rules and policies.20 4
Some of these courts have held that an employee handbook
can create obligations on the part of the employer but have lim-
ited this rule in various ways. For instance, in Stokes v. Worthing-
ton Industries, Inc., the court held that there can be no contrac-
tual intent if the employee was not aware of the handbook at the
time of termination.20 5 Other courts have refused to enforce
promises in an employment manual where the employee was not
aware of the specific provision within the manual.206 The court, in
Karnes v. Doctors Hospital,20 7 held that a handbook promulgated
after the employee was hired was not part of the employment
agreement.20 8
These courts have also upheld disclaimers and attestation
clauses in employee contracts, holding that a disclaimer in a hand-
book is sufficient evidence of the lack of contractual intent.20 9 A
1215 (1988).
201. See Pyle v. Ledex, 49 Ohio App. 3d 139, 145-46, 551 N.E.2d 205, 211-12
(1988); Seymour v. ITT Corp., No. 3-87-4, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2148 (June 2, 1988).
202. See Hoops v. United Tel. Co., No. WD-87-62, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3457
(Aug. 26, 1988), affid, 50 Ohio St. 3d 97, 553 N.E.2d 252 (1990).
203. Id. at 7-8; Faykosh v. Jewish Community Center, No. L-87-335, 1988 Ohio
App. LEXIS 3377, at 9 (Aug. 19, 1988); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 8,
472 N.E.2d 765, 773 (1984).
204. Ferguson v. Massillon Community Hosp., Nos. CA-7770, CA-7823, 1989 Ohio
App. LEXIS 4744, at 4 (Dec. 18, 1989); Uebelacker v. Cincom Sys., 48 Ohio App. 3d 268,
272, 549 N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (1988); Curak v. Cleveland Clinic Found., No. 54822, 1988
Ohio App. LEXIS 5281, at 13 (Dec. 22, 1988), dismissed, 43 Ohio St. 3d 701, 539 N.E.2d
164 (1989); Miscoi v. Summit County Community Drug Bd., No. 13444, 1988 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2873, at 4 (July 20, 1988); Mosely v. Warrensville Heights, No. 53930, 1988 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1898, at 7 (May 19, 1988); Cohen & Co. v. Messina, 24 Ohio App. 3d 22,
24, 492 N.E.2d 867, 870 (1985).
205. No. 88AP-583, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2636, at 14 (June 28, 1989).
206. Id. at 18-19 (employee had to be aware of disciplinary procedures in order for
the handbook to be a binding contract).
207. No. 87AP-1028, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4317 (Oct. 27, 1988).
208. Id. at 10.
209. See, e.g., Beamon v. Bennett Management Corp., No. L-88-334, 1989 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1819, at 8 (May 19, 1989); Etengoff v. Robert Half, Inc., No. 56116, 1989
Ohio App. LEXIS 1579, at 3 (Apr. 27, 1989); Tedesco v. Glenbeigh Hosp., Inc., No.
1236 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1209
signed attestation clause in which the employee acknowledges his
or her status as an at-will employee has also been held to be evi-
dence of an at-will relationship. 21° In addition to demonstrating a
lack of intent to contract, disclaimer and attestation clauses may
make any reliance on handbook promises unreasonable, and thus
make the doctrine of promissory estoppel inapplicable.211 Separate
consideration is then necessary to make any promise by an em-
ployer binding; the employee's continued work is not sufficient or
independent consideration. 1 2
Under another line of cases, some courts have taken less
traditional approaches to the employment contract, holding that
employment manuals may create rights that the employer may
not abridge without creating liability.213 Some courts have fol-
lowed ordinary rules of contract construction in strictly construing
the terms of an employment manual against an employer that was
responsible for drafting the manual. 1 4 Employment manuals or
employer representations may constitute offers for the formation
of a unilateral contract.2 15 The acceptance of the employer's offer
54899, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 899, at 5 (Mar. 16, 1989); Gaumont v. Emery Air Freight
Corp., No. 11199, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 494, at 15-16 (Feb. 16, 1989); Tohline v. Cen-
tral Trust Co., 48 Ohio App. 3d 280, 549 N.E.2d 1223 (1988); Uebelacker v. Cincom Sys.,
48 Ohio App. 3d 268, 272, 549 N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (1988); Parsons v. Denny's Restaurant,
No. CA-2608, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 5109, at 7 (Dec. 9, 1988); Dougan v. St. Joseph
Hosp., No. 4332, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3408, at 6 (Aug. 17, 1988); Taylor v. Research
Laboratories, Inc., 51 Ohio App. 3d 15, 15, 554 N.E.2d 114, 114 (1988); Wargo v. ITT
Lester Indus., Inc., No. 53637, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1362, at 4-5 (Apr. 14, 1988);
Assmus v. Bettcher Mfg. Co., No. 53527, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 881, at 4-5 (Mar. 17,
1988).
210. See, e.g., Gaumont, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS at 16; Kiel v. Circuit Design Tech-
nology, 55 Ohio App. 3d 63, 66, 562 N.E.2d 517, 520 (1988); Taylor, 51 Ohio App. 3d at
15, 554 N.E.2d at 114; Uebelacker, 48 Ohio App. 3d at 271, 549 N.E.2d at 1216; Straka
v. K Mart Corp., No. 3926, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2742, at 3-4 (July 8, 1988).
211. See, e.g., Beamon v. Bennett Management Corp., No. L-88-334, 1989 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1819, at 9-10 (May 19, 1989); Etengoff, No. 56116, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS
at 2; Tedesco v. Glenbeigh Hosp. Inc., No. 54899, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 899, at 6 (Mar.
16, 1989); Uebelacker, 48 Ohio App. 3d at 273-74, 549 N.E.2d at 1217-18.
212. See, e.g., Pyle v. Ledex, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 3d 139, 146, 551 N.E.2d 205, 212
(1988); Welser v. General Tel. Co., No. 9-86-13, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3878, at 5-6
(Sept. 20, 1988); Wilson v. Riverside Hosp., No. L-87-172, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 899,
at 4-5 (Mar. 18, 1988); Cohen & Co. v. Messina, 24 Ohio App. 3d 22, 25, 492 N.E.2d
867, 871 (1985).
213. Getto v. Board of Comm'rs Stark Metro. Hous. Auth., No. CA-7135, slip op. at
7 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1987).
214. Adams v. Harding Mach. Co., 56 Ohio App. 3d 150, 153, 565 N.E.2d 858, 860
(1989); Mastroianni v. Marymount Hosp., No. 52178, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov.
26, 1986).
215. See, e.g., Ault v. St. John Medical Center, No. 86-J-22, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct.
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is effective where the employee remains with the employer after
learning of the employer's new policy.218 By foregoing the pursuit
of other employment opportunities and continuing performance,
the employee gives adequate consideration to render the new pol-
icy enforceable. 217 A disclaimer, by itself, does not necessarily es-
tablish at-will status.218
There is little to explain the inconsistencies among the lower
and appellate courts. The Ohio Supreme Court has yet to address
most of the issues responsible for the lower courts' confusion. The
decisions in Helmick, Worrell, and Kelly, however, suggest a new
willingness to address these issues.
C. Public Policy Exception
Even more indicative of a new spirit in the court is the deci-
sion in Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc.219
In Greeley the Ohio Supreme Court recognized a cause of action
in tort where an employee is discharged in violation of public pol-
icy. This recognition of a public policy exception to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine was a significant departure from Ohio's ab-
solutist tradition.22 °
The first recognition of this public policy exception to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine came in Phung v. Waste Management,
Inc.221 In Phung a Sandusky County appellate court broke with
the at-will tradition and held that a cause of action for wrongful
discharge could be brought in tort.222 Phung was a chemist for the
App. Aug. 10, 1987); King v. Hospital Care Corp., No. 1-85-1, slip op. at 12 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 13, 1986).
216. King, No. 1-85-1, slip op. at 13.
217. See, e.g., Nichols v. Waterfield Fin. Corp., 62 Ohio App. 3d 717, 577 N.E.2d
422 (1989).
218. See, e.g., Dougan v. St. Joseph Hosp., No. 4332, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3408,
at 7 (Aug. 17, 1989) (Mahoney, J., dissenting); Pond v. Devon Hotels, Ltd., 55 Ohio App.
3d 268, 269, 563 N.E.2d 738, 740 (1988). The employer may not unilaterally the amend
contract by subsequently inserting a disclaimer. King v. Hospital Care Corp., No. 1-85-1,
1986 Ohio App. LEXIS at 17 (May 13, 1986).
219. 49 Ohio St. 3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990).
220. See, e.g., Peterson v. Scott Constr. Co., 5 Ohio App. 3d 203, 205, 451 N.E.2d
1236, 1239 (1982) (While the "court recognize[d] the trend of other jurisdictions which
impose public policy limitations on an employment contract ... it is likewise apparent
that Ohio has not deviated from the traditional rule of law.") (quoting Wolf v. First Nat'l
Bank, 20 Ohio Op. 3d 262, 263 (1980)).
221. No. S-84-4, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 1 (Oct. 19, 1984).
222. Id. at 16; see Goodspeed v. Airborne Express, Inc., 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3216
(Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Merkel v. Scovill, 570 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Ohio 1983), affd in part
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defendant, Waste Management, which operated a toxic waste dis-
posal facility. Phung was dismissed for reporting to his employer
that it was operating its business in violation of the law. Plaintiff
was terminated and then brought an action for wrongful dis-
charge. The plaintiff argued that the court should recognize a
public policy exception to the general employment-at-will rule.223
Justice Douglas, writing for the appellate court, agreed:
224
Admittedly, defining "public policy" presents difficulty, and
in that respect, it would be easier for us to interpret public pol-
icy as only those areas where the legislature has indeed spoken.
.. .[B]ut simply because the legislature has not acted in
this area does not mean that this court should ignore the recent
judicial developments in our sister states. "The law should be
based on current concepts of what is right and just and the judi-
ciary should be alert to the never-ending need for keeping its
common law principles abreast of the times. Ancient distinctions
which make no sense in today's society and tend to discredit the
law should be readily rejected. 12 25
On appeal the Ohio Supreme Court refused to recognize a
public policy exception and held that Phung's claims were nothing
more than "broad, conclusory allegations that Waste Manage-
ment, Inc. was violating certain unspecified legal and societal obli-
gations .... '221 The court held that these allegations failed to
state a violation of a sufficiently clear public policy to warrant the
creation of a cause of action.227 The court maintained that be-
cause the Ohio Constitution delegated to the legislature the pri-
mary responsibility for protecting the welfare of employees, the
judiciary would defer in matters of employment and retaliatory
discharge. 228
In dissent, Justice Brown echoed the concerns of the appellate
and rev'd in part, 787 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 990 (1986); West v.
Roadway Express, No. 10263, 1982 Ohio App. LEXIS 1 (April 12, 1982).
223. Phung, No. S-84-4, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS at 3.
224. Not long after writing the opinion in Phung, Justice Douglas was elected to the
Ohio Supreme Court. When Phung came up on appeal, Justice Douglas recused himself.
225. Phung, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS at 10-11 (quoting O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 390
A.2d 149, 150 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978)).
226. Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 102, 491 N.E.2d 1114,
1116 (1986).
227. Id. at 102, 491 N.E.2d at 1116-17. "Public policy does not require that there be
an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an employee is discharged for re-
porting to his employer that it is conducting its business in violation of law." Id. at 103,
491 N.E.2d at 1117.
228. Id.
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opinion, noting the court's constitutional duty, in the absence of
legislative action, to provide remedies where rights have been vio-
lated, and called for the court to recognize a cause of action for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.2 29 Moreover, Jus-
tice Brown argued that because the doctrine of employment at
will was a judicially created rule, the court's duty to provide a
remedy was even more compelling.23 ° Furthermore, Justice Brown
noted that the dissent in the appellate opinion never stated that
Phung's allegations were so vague and conclusory as to be insuffi-
cient to state a cause of action.
Alarmed by the court's inaction and indifference to employ-
ees' rights and large public policy concerns, the Ohio legislature
passed a whistleblower's protection act.23 1 The statute provides
remedies for retaliatory discharge that may include reinstatement,
back pay, reinstatement of seniority, and fringe benefits.3 2 Attor-
ney's fees are available if the party bringing the action prevails. 233
No punitive damages, however, are available under the statute.23 4
In Greeley, the Ohio Supreme Court was not as reluctant to
recognize a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine as it was
in Phung. Moreover, the Greeley decision acknowledged that tort
remedies would be available for an employee wrongfully dis-
charged in violation of public policy.235
Appellant Greeley had been fired when his employer received
an order to withhold child support payments from Greeley's
wages. 236 The employer was fined five hundred dollars for violat-
ing section 3113.213(D) of the Ohio code, which prohibits such a
discharge. The statute, however, did not provide for reinstatement.
The lower courts dismissed Greeley's tort claim for wrongful* dis-
charge finding that Ohio did not recognize this cause of action.237
The Supreme Court determined that the legislature did not
intend that employers should be able to violate the underlying
purposes of the statute by paying a minimal fine.238 It found that,
229. Id. at 107, 491 N.E.2d at 1120 (Brown, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
231. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4113.51-53 (Anderson 1991).
232. Id. § 4113.52(E).
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. Greeley, 49 Ohio St. 3d at 239, 551 N.E.2d at 987.
236. Id. at 229, 551 N.E.2d at 982.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 232, 551 N.E.2d at 984. The employer's fine was suspended when it com-
plied with the court order to pay the child support the employer had refused to withhold.
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although the statute did not expressly provide for a civil remedy,
there was little to indicate that the General Assembly intended to
foreclose other remedies.2"9 According to the court the statute pro-
vided a sufficiently clear statement of public policy to warrant an
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.240 Attempting to
harmonize Greeley with past decisions, the court declared that
employment at will was still "alive and well" in Ohio; the court's
ruling was merely a modification of that doctrine.241 The right of
employers to terminate at will, however, for "any cause" no longer
included the right to discharge an employee where the discharge
would violate a statute and thereby contravene public policy.242
The court also acknowledged that other public policy exceptions
might be recognized if the discharge were "of equally serious im-
pact as the violation of a statute. 2 43
Despite the majority's assurances that the at-will doctrine
was alive and well, Greeley marked a significant departure from
earlier adherence to the at-will doctrine. Traditionally, courts
were reluctant to play a significant role in the development of em-
ployment termination law. Greeley, albeit cautiously, accepted the
court's role in shaping the common law. Noting the change of
tone, lower courts have extended the public policy exception to the
at-will doctrine. One appellate court extended the exception to
prohibit the discharge of an employee and her mother in retalia-
tion for the employee missing work to attend jury duty.244
D. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Ohio courts have consistently refused to impose a duty on the
employer to only terminate employees only in good faith. In
Id. at 229, 551 N.E.2d at 982.
239. Id. at 233, 551 N.E.2d at 986. In dissent, Justice Holmes interpreted the legis-
lative history differently. The legislature had amended the statute in 1986 to eliminate a
provision for reinstatement of the discharged employee. Justice Holmes found this to be a
clear indication that the legislature did not intend to create a civil cause of action for
damages in violation of the statute. Id. at 236, 551 N.E.2d at 988-89 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
240. Id. at 233, 551 N.E.2d at 986. The court stated that it was adhering to Phung,
in which it "held that public policy does not require that there be an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine, absent a sufficiently clear public policy . . . ." Id.
241. Id. at 234, 551 N.E.2d at 987.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 235, 551 N.E.2d at 987.
244. Schaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc., 57 Ohio App. 3d 18, 566 N.E.2d 193 (1990).
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Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co.,2 45 the court held that an em-
ployer could lawfully dismiss at-will employees even if the termi-
nation was willful, wanton, malicious, and done with intentional
bad faith.246 The court, in Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 247 re-
fused to recognize an exception for malicious acts or to impose a
duty to act in good faith.248 Phung v. Waste Management, Inc.249
reaffirmed Fawcett and refused to recognize a public policy excep-
tion to the at-will doctrine.250 Without a public policy exception to
the at-will doctrine, courts summarily refused to entertain a cause
of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in
employment termination. Appellate opinions dismissed these
claims with little or no discussion.251 While the decision in Greeley
acknowledged that there may be a number of public policy excep-
tions to the at-will doctrine, it is not clear whether the court will
find a similar exception to the at-will doctrine in the duty of good
faith and fair dealing.
E. Summary
Although the majority in Greeley stated that employment at-
will was "alive and well" in Ohio,252 a better characterization
would be that it is alive but "wounded and limping. '25 Various
court decisions have landed hobbling blows to the at-will doctrine.
245. 46 Ohio St. 2d 245, 348 N.E.2d 144 (1976).
246. Id. at 250, 348 N.E.2d at 147.
247. 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
248. Id. at 105, 483 N.E.2d at 155.
249. 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 114 (1986).
250. Id. at 102, 491 N.E.2d at 1116 (employment contracts can be terminated at
anytime, regardless of any gross or reckless disregard for the employee's rights).
251. See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Hilti, Inc., 52 Ohio App. 3d 21, 556 N.E.2d 212
(1989); Kuhn v. St. John & West Shore Hosp., 50 Ohio App. 3d 23, 552 N.E.2d 240
(1989); Pyle v. Ledex, 49 Ohio App. 3d 139, 551 N.E.2d 205 (1988); Curak v. Cleveland
Clinic Found., No. 54822, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 5281 (Dec. 22, 1988); Kelly v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., No. 1645, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1994 (May 4, 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 46 Ohio St. 3d 134, 545 N.E.2d 1244 (1989). But see Dax v. Meck, No. CA85-
05-046, slip op. (Ohio App. June 30, 1986) (allowing a claim for breach of implied cove-
nant of good faith).
252. Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 49 Ohio St. 3d 228,
233, 551 N.E.2d 981, 986 (1990); see Note, supra note 175, at 743.
253. Parsons v. Denny's Restaurants, No. CA-2608, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 5109,
at 3 (Dec. 9, 1988). This case was decided before Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance
Contractors, Inc., 49 Ohio St. 3d 228, 551 N.E. 2d 981 (1990), Worrell v. Multipress Inc.,
45 Ohio St. 3d 241, 543 N.E.2d 1277 (1989), Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing,
Inc., 45 Ohio St. 3d 131, 543 N.E.2d 1212 (1989), or Kelly v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 46
Ohio St. 3d 134, 545 N.E.2d 1244 (1989).
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Helmick reasserted the validity of Mers over the absolutism of
Phung.254 Worrell expanded the remedies for breach of an em-
ployment contract to include front pay.255 Kelly held that Mers is
to be read broadly and precluded summary judgment where there
is some evidence that employer representations may have modified
the at-will contract.256 Finally, Greeley recognized a cause of ac-
tion in tort for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. 25
In spite of the new found enthusiasm of courts to find common
law exceptions to the at-will doctrine, limited applicability of the
exceptions and the ever-shrinking numbers of employees covered
by collective bargaining agreements leave the vast majority of em-
ployees unprotected from capricious employers.
III. CATCHING UP WITH THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
We are dependent upon others for our means of livelihood, and
most of our people have become completely dependent upon
wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for
the relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such
dependence of the mass of the people upon others for all of their
income is something new in the world. For our generation, the
substance of life is in another man's hands.258
The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that "[a] fundamental
policy in favor of the employment-at-will doctrine is the principle
that parties to a contractual relationship should have the complete
freedom to fashion whatever relationship they so desire."' 59 Thus,
Ohio employment law still clings to a nineteenth century doctrine
that fails to provide justice to twentieth century employees. The
formalism of "freedom of contract" that gave rise to employment
at will is still used to justify employment contracts of adhesion.2 60
Modern contract law, however, has moved beyond formalism to
accommodate conceptions of fairness and public policy.2 16 1 Courts
254. See supra text accompanying notes 185-90.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 191-93.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 194-97.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 219-44.
258. F. TANNENDAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) (emphasis omitted).
259. Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 103, 491 N.E.2d 1114,
1116 (1986) (citations omitted).
260. See id.
261. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 205 (1979):§ 178. When a Term Is Unenforceable on Grounds of Public Policy
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of
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in many jurisdictions have attempted to adapt the judge-made
doctrine of employment at will to the realities of modern employ-
ment relations . 62 This common law process has involved a balanc-
ing of the interests of employees, employers, and the public. 263
The balance in Ohio up to this point, however, has emphasized the
need for continuity and certainty at the expense of justice.26 4
A. A Modern Approach to Employment Contracts
Ohio presently recognizes two narrow exceptions to employ-
ment at 5
will: implied contract and promissory estoppel.265 Neither of these
exceptions has been consistently applied, however, and much of
the case law in both areas should be redirected to conform to
modern employment law.
1. Implied Contract
The most common approach to employment contracts in Ohio
sees the contract as a standard bilateral contract that must meet
the requirements of offer, acceptance, and consideration. 26 6 Most
public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
against the enforcement of such terms.
§ 205. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in
its performance and its enforcement.
See also id. §§ 175-177 (effect of duress and undue influence on enforceability of con-
tracts); id. §§ 206-208 (rules of construction, unconscionable contracts).
262. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 71, 417 A.2d 505,
511 (1980) ("This Court has long recognized the capacity of the common law to develop
and adapt to current needs.").
263. "In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the em-
ployer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest
of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a
proper balance between the two." Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316
A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
264. The Ohio Supreme Court admitted as much in Mers:
[W]e are not persuaded that modern developments which have taken place in
employment relationships constitute a sufficient basis for us to now totally abol-
ish the employment-at-will doctrine. Such an action would, among other things,
place Ohio's courts in the untenable position of having to second-guess the busi-
ness judgments of employers. The need for certainty and continuity in the law
requires us to stand by precedent and not disturb a settled point unless ex-
traordinary circumstances require it.
Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 103, 483 N.E.2d 150, 153 (1985).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 134-218.
266. Curiously, many courts holding this view have cited Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15
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cases involve an employee alleging that the original at-will agree-
ment was modified by the provisions of an employee handbook or
oral representations by the employer. The modifications are usu-
ally alleged to permit termination only for cause or to provide cer-
tain procedural rights.
Courts that apply the bilateral contract standard require sep-
arate independent consideration to support any oral promise or
handbook provision that might modify an at-will agreement.2 7
The intent of the parties to be bound by such promises or repre-
sentations is also required. 68 Judged by these standards, few
handbooks or oral representations qualify as enforceable contracts
and the employees are then subject to the employment-at-will doc-
trine. Summary judgment is often granted to the employer be-
cause of the absence of independent consideration or intent to con-
tract, or because of the presence of a disclaimer.6 9
However, these are the wrong standards to apply. Few em-
ployment agreements are actually bargained for as bilateral con-
tracts. Most employment applicants are faced with a "take it or
leave it" situation. In some cases of upper level management em-
ployees, actual bargaining does take place and the bilateral model
is appropriate. In the vast majority of employment agreements,
Ohio App. 3d 1, 472 N.E.2d 765 (1984), in support of a traditional view of employment
agreements as standard bilateral contracts: "When such oral or written modifications of the
original employment contract satisfy the paradigm elements essential to contract forma-
tion-i.e., offer, acceptance, consideration-binding obligations arise". Id. at 8, 472 N.E.2d
at 773. This is a highly selective use of the case, as the next sentence in Helle states that
"[g]iven this perspective, the present contractual analysis is ill-served by mechanical refer-
ences to the employment-at-will doctrine." Id. Helle then goes on to posit a unilateral
contract theory.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 45-64.
268. One of the most frequently cited authorities for this position is Cohen & Co. v.
Messina, 24 Ohio App. 3d 22, 492 N.E.2d 867 (1985). "[I]n order for such manuals to be
considered valid contracts, there must be a 'meeting of the minds.' The parties must have a
distinct and common intention which is communicated by each party to the other." Id. at
24, 492 N.E.2d at 870 (citations omitted). Cohen, however, is distinguishable from the
typical employee manual case. In Cohen, the employer sued the employee for breach of an
alleged agreement by which an employee leaving the firm would compensate the firm for
any clients he or she took along. The alleged agreement was unilaterally imposed by the
employer after the employee had been hired. Id. at 22-23, 492 N.E.2d at 869. When the
court called for evidence of a meeting of the minds, therefore, it was protecting the em-
ployee against a bad faith effort by the employer to impose a contract. These facts hardly
fit the situation where an employee seeks in good faith to enforce terms of discharge
promulgated by the employer.
269. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257
(1985).
270. See, e.g., Worrell v. Multipress, Inc., 45 Ohio St. 3d 241, 543 N.E.2d 1277
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however,- the adhesion outweighs the bargaining.
Some courts have applied a unilateral contract analysis to
employment contracts.2 71  Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57
N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y. Supp. 2d 193 (1982);
Day v. Good Samaritan Hospital2P7 2 and Helle v. Landmark,
Inc. 7 1 rejected an "asphyxiative construction of the 'at-will' doc-
trine" and-sought to protect the legitimate expectations of em-
ployees created by employer policy statements and personnel
manuals. 27 4 The unilateral analysis eliminates the problem of con-
sideration. The employee's retention of employment and continued
work performance should be sufficient consideration to make any
handbook provision or oral representation an enforceable modifi-
cation to the original at-will agreement.275 However, the employee
would have to be aware of the handbook provisions for there to
have been acceptance by performance.
Although the unilateral analysis holds that the employer may
not make illusory promises, its solution of the consideration prob-
lem proves equally illusory. Most courts proposing a unilateral
theory have stated that disclaimers of contractual intent would re-
lieve the employer of liability for its promises.276 Thus the inser-
tion of the proper magic words of disclaimer would once again
render any handbook promises illusory.
At first blush, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield2 71
seemed to advance unilateral theory. But as the Michigan Su-
preme Court later explained, "the analysis employed in Toussaint
• ..focused upon the benefit that accrues to an employer when it
(1989); State ex reL Robertson v. Board of Trustees of Clark Technical College, No. 2416,
1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1810 (May 13, 1988).
271. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980);
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) (procedural safeguards
in employee handbook are binding); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y. 2d 458, 443
N.E. 2d 441, 457 N.Y. Supp. 2d 193 (1982).
272. No. 8062, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS (Aug. 17, 1983).
273. 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 472 N.E.2d 765 (1984).
274. Id. at 7, 472 N.E.2d at 772.
275. See id. at 10-11, 472 N.E.2d at 775; Day, No. 8062, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS at
10.
276. "All that need be done is the inclusion in a very prominent position of an appro-
priate statement that there is no promise of any kind by the employer contained in the
manual ... regardless of what the manual says or provides .... " Woolley v. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 309, 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (1985); see, e.g., Helle, 15 Ohio
App. 3d at 28, 472 N.E.2d at 774; Day, No. 8062, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS at 24-30.
277. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
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establishes desirable personnel policies. 21 8 Written personnel poli-
cies are not enforceable because they have been "offered and ac-
cepted" as a unilateral contract, rather their enforceability arises
from the benefit the employer derives by establishing such poli-
cies. 79 The employer derives benefit from a cooperative and loyal
work force.28 0 Additionally, handbooks may enable the employer
to avoid the installation of a union.28'
The formalistic view of disclaimers as necessarily dispositive
of the question of employer liability is part of a nineteenth century
anachronism that Ohio must discard. Toussaint held that dis-
claimers could effectively relieve the employer of liability for its
promises in a manual. 8 2 Yet this is inconsistent with the benefit
analysis expounded by the Michigan Supreme Court. The benefits
accruing to the employer are not extinguished by the use of a dis-
claimer. The employer's intent is to continue to reap the benefits
that handbooks provide yet escape responsibility for the promise
that gave rise to those benefits.2 83 The employer often knows that
employees will not notice or understand the effect of disclaimers.
Ohio courts have held that disclaimers can be negated by
other provisions of the manual or by oral representations.
The handbook must be read as a whole, not by isolated
parts. Repeated assurances of continued employment unless dis-
charged for just cause coupled with an isolated disclaimer or
reservation of termination at will, requires a factual determina-
tion as to the provisions that are understood and enforced, and
an effort should be made to reconcile the provisions of the
handbook.284
278. In re Certified Question, 432 Mich. 438, 453, 443 N.W.2d 112, 119 (1989).
279. Id; see also supra text accompanying notes 200-18.
280. Certified Question, 432 Mich. at 439, 443 N.W.2d at 119.
281. See Spring v. A & D Foodarama, No. CA-7095, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
8, 1987).
282. Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 612, 292 N.W.2d at 891 (1980).
283. One Ohio judge has expressed concern that:
[W]e have over-emphasized the weight and effect to be given disclaimers in em-
ployer's work manuals on the employment-at-will doctrine. While employers
have promised tenure for good behavior in accordance with a manual, we have
permitted employers to deny the existence of a contract and fire employees ...
even though they complied with the manual.
As a matter of public policy, we should not permit employers to hide behind
disclaimers, but rather we should look to the manuals, etc. to determine if there
is in fact a contract.
Dougan v. St. Joseph Hosp., No. 4332, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3408, at 7 (Aug. 17, 1988)
(Mahoney, J., dissenting).
284. Pond v. Devon Hotels, Ltd., No. 88AP-62, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4607, at 12-
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Thus the context of the manual itself is capable of negating the
disclaimer.
Oral representations can also negate the effects of written
disclaimers.2 85 Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. held that "the facts
and circumstances surrounding an oral employment-at-will agree-
ment . . . can be considered by the trier of fact in order to deter-
mine the agreement's explicit and implicit terms concerning dis-
charge. ' 286 The optional "can be considered" is precisely the type
of statement that has resulted in the inconsistency of Ohio em-
ployment law. Any realistic assessment of the effect of a dis-
claimer should require that the facts and circumstances be consid-
ered by the trier of fact.
The employer's continued enjoyment of the benefits of the
handbook provisions argues against the recognition of employer
disclaimers. The general rule of construction that an ambiguity in
a contract will be construed against the drafter "applies to em-
ployment contracts" 217 and undermines the effect of the dis-
claimer. Disclaimers are necessarily ambiguous and create mate-
rial issues of fact precluding summary judgment.2 88 The weight
and effect of disclaimers is continually overemphasized by Ohio
courts.
2. Promissory Estoppel
Ohio has also recognized that the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel is applicable to employment contracts.28  The effect of this
recognition has been to relieve the pressure on the Supreme Court
to provide a theoretical basis and practical standards for deter-
mining whether there has been a modification of an at-will con-
tract. In providing a by-pass in the form of promissory estoppel,
13 (Nov. 10, 1988).
285. See Helle, 15 Ohio App. 3d at 10, 472 N.E.2d at 775; Kochis v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., No. CA-2175, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS I (Feb. 23, 1984).
286. Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 104, 483 N.E.2d 150, 154
(1985).
287. See Adams v. Harding Mach. Co., 56 Ohio App. 3d 150, 565 N.E.2d 857
(1989); Biskupich v. Westbay Manor Nursing Home, 33 Ohio App. 3d 220, 515 N.E.2d
632 (1986); Bolling v. Clevepak, 20 Ohio App. 3d 113, 484 N.E.2d 1367 (1984).
288. See Pond, 55 Ohio App. 3d at 268, 563 N.E.2d at 739. The disclaimer can be
interpreted as denying only that the handbook alone was the employment contract. This
does not preclude the handbook from constituting a part of the employment contract, sup-
plying terms along with other representations, circumstances, and customs. Id. at 274, 563
N.E.2d at 744.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 134-218.
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the court has avoided the issue of implied contract theory. Rather
than taking on the responsibility of a common law court to adapt
the law to modern conditions, the Ohio Supreme Court chose to
fall back on the equitable powers of the courts. Problems of con-
sideration, intent, and disclaimers were left to the lower courts to
decide with little more than a vague exhortation.2 90
Promissory estoppel has often been used to prevent injustice
where consideration requirements are not satisfied. 9 1 However,
the relaxed consideration requirement is more than offset by the
introduction of new hurdles: the reasonableness of the reliance and
the detrimental nature of that reliance. In practice, the question
of whether the reliance was reasonable often boils down to the
same question that arises in an implied contract inquiry: was there
a clear promise? Many courts, upon finding no clear promise that
would enable an implied contract, deny the promissory estoppel
claim without any additional inquiry.2" 2
Disclaimers have also been held to make reliance on hand-
book promises or employer representations unreasonable293 and
290. The Ohio Supreme Court gave the doctrine of promissory estoppel as applied in
the employment context the following articulation:
[T]he doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable and binding to oral employ-
ment-at-will agreements .... The test in such cases is whether the employer
should have reasonably expected its representation to be ielied upon by its em-
ployee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted
and was detrimental to the employee.
Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 105, 483 N.E.2d 150, 155 (1985). One
court has formulated the essential elements of promissory estoppel in a far more restrictive
manner than Mers: "There must be a promise, clear and unambiguous in its terms, reli-
ance by the party to whom the promise is made, the reliance must be reasonable and
foreseeable, and the party claiming estoppel must be injured by the reliance." Cohen &
Co. v. Messina, 24 Ohio App. 3d 22, 26, 492 N.E.2d 867, 872 (1985): However, Cohen
dealt with a situation where an employer was seeking to enforce a handbook provision to
the detriment of an employee. Its strict requirements were intended to protect the em-
ployee. Id. That has not deterred some courts from citing Cohen to require a clear unam-
biguous promise from the employer before his promise can be enforced. See, e.g., Manofsky
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 14548, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4434 (Oct. 3, 1990).
291. See Uebelacker v. Cincom Sys., 48 Ohio App. 3d 268, 273-74, 549 N.E.2d
1210, 1217 (1988); Blackwell v. U.A.W., 9 Ohio App. 3d 179, 183, 458 N.E.2d 1272, 1276
(1983); Talley v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No. 377, 48 Ohio St. 2d 142, 146,
357 N.E.2d 44, 47 (1976).
292. See, e.g., Kiel v. Circuit Design Technology, 55 Ohio App. 3d 63, 67, 562
N.E.2d 517, 521 (1988); Curak v. Cleveland Clinic Found., No. 54822, 1988 Ohio App.
LEXIS 5281, at 15 (Dec. 22, 1988); Parsons v. Denny's Restaurant, No. CA-2608, 1988
Ohio App. LEXIS 5109, at 13 (Dec. 9, 1988); Turner v. SPS Technologies, Inc., No.
51945, slip op. at 13, (Ohio Ct. App. June, 4, 1987); Cohen & Co. v. Messina, 24 Ohio
App. 3d 22, 26, 492 N.E.2d 867, 872 (1985).
293. See, e.g., Beamon v. Bennett Management Corp., No. L-88-334, 1989 Ohio
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may supply the basis for summary judgment in favor of the em-
ployer on a claim of promissory estoppel.29 4 The disclaimer creates
just as much of an issue for the trier of fact in a promissory estop-
pel claim as it does with implied contract, however. Summary
judgment is equally inappropriate in either case.
With no standards from the Ohio Supreme Court governing
detrimental reliance, the appellate courts have created widely di-
vergent standards of their own. Some courts have required the
plaintiff to have turned down other job offers.29 5 This requirement
leads to the anomalous result that the employee who relies heavily
on employer representations and does not look for ,other employ-
ment will have no other job offers and thus will be unable to show
detrimental reliance. The employee who relies less on employer
representations will be more likely to seek other work, garner
other job offers, and show detrimental reliance. Other courts have
held that foregoing the search of other employment is sufficient to
demonstrate detrimental reliance.296 There is little predictability
for either employers or employees. The existence of an equitable
safety net such as promissory estoppel is certainly appropriate, but
this often proves illusory in the absence of clear standards for its
application. An extraordinary remedy for the unusual case should
not be used to avoid providing a coherent theory and remedy for
the typical case.
B. Beyond Contract: The Necessity of Tort Remedies
The second common issue presented is [the] contention that
the right of employers "to terminate employment at will for any
cause, at any time whatever, is not absolute, but limited by prin-
ciples which protect persons from gross or reckless disregard of
their rights and interests, wilful, wanton or malicious acts or
acts done intentionally, with insult, or in bad faith. 12 97
App. LEXIS 1819, at 9-10 (May 19, 1989); Uebelacker, 48 Ohio App. 3d at 272, 549
N.E.2d at 1216-17; Tedesco v. Glenbeigh Hosp. Inc., No. 54899, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS
899, at 5 (Mar. 16, 1989).
294. See, e.g., Uebelacker, 48 Ohio App. 3d at 273-74, 549 N.E.2d at 1217-18.
295. See McKenney v. Structural Fibers, Inc., No. 89-L-14-018, 1989 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2980, at 12 (July 28, 1989); Wilson v. Riverside Hosp., No. L-87-172, 1988 Ohio
App. LEXIS 899, at 7-8 (Mar. 18, 1988).
296. Spring v. A & D Foodarama, No. CA-7095, slip op. at 9 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
8, 1987); Hedrick v. Center for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment, 7 Ohio App. 3d
211, 214, 454 N.E.2d 1343, 1346-47 (1982).
297. Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio St. 2d 245, 249, 348 N.E.2d 144, 147
(1976).
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Although fundamental fairness, social policy, and basic tort
principles might have made the above contention appear self-evi-
dent, the Ohio Supreme Court found otherwise. In the face of ap-
pellate activism, the court in Phung v. Waste Management,
Inc.,"' reasserted the Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co.299 tradition.
It effectively foreclosed the possibility of either a public policy ex-
ception or tort remedies in general. The narrow measure of equi-
table relief provided by the whistleblower's protection statute"'0
does not go far enough. By only allowing for back pay, the statute
may make it profitable for the employer to fire the employee and
pay the statutory price. The employer would be rid of the trouble-
some employee and would chill any activity by the remaining em-
ployees. The statute lacks the teeth that only punitive damages
can provide.
Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc."°'
reinvigorates these possibilities-but only marginally. Even the
strongest public policy exception directly affects only a very small
number of cases. Its indirect effect, however, can be much larger.
The public policy exception is a general barometer of the climate
for employment rights. Historically, it has created the grounds for
more substantial recognition of employee rights.30 2 The public pol-
icy exception can be seen as a special case of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing where a violation of a statute or
regulation is taken as a per se violation of the covenant. Recogni-
tion of this covenant is the next step after Greeley. Without such a
step, Greeley is an empty gesture that will have little if any effect
on employee rights in Ohio.
It is a basic tort principle that a malicious or intentionally
harmful act towards another gives rise to a cause of action in
tort.303 Both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts"4 and the
Uniform Commercial Code30 5 impose a duty of good faith and fair
298. 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986).
299. 46 Ohio St. 2d 245, 348 N.E.2d 144 (1976).
300. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.51 (Anderson 1991); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 231-34.
301. 49 Ohio St. 3d 288, 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990).
302. See supra text accompanying notes 65-83.
303. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (5th ed. 1984).
304. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance and enforcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 205
(1979).
305. "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in
1250 [Vol. 41:1209
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dealing on all contracts. Jurisdictions that have recognized an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment con-
tracts have found that it sounds in tort as well as contract. 08 The
analogy to the implied covenant in insurance contracts has been
307
Ohio has long recognized that insurance companies have a
duty to act in good faith toward their insureds and that a breach
of this duty will give rise to an action in tort.308 Punitive damages
may be recovered against an insurer who has breached this duty
upon a showing of actual malice, fraud, or insult.309 The inequal-
ity of bargaining power between employer and employee is just as
great as that between the insurer and insured.310 The conflict of
interest between the employer and employee is just as great as
that between the insurer and insured. In each case a tort remedy
is essential to protect against arbitrary and malicious conduct. In-
surance contracts are not merely contracts entered into for com-
mercial gain, but agreements designed to provide for security
against accidental loss. Employment provides far more. It provides
status, income, future income security, and benefits such as medi-
cal insurance, life insurance, and pension.311 One can do without
insurance, but one cannot do without employment.3 12 The reliance
and dependence of the employee upon the employer is every bit as
great as the reliance in the insurance context.31 3 Often the wrong-
fully discharged worker cannot mitigate damages by finding other
employment.
its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978).
306. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 454-55, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722, 728-29 (1980).
307. See id. at 454, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
308. See Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315
(1983). For wrongful discharge cases rejecting an extension of the insurance analogy to the
employment context, see Brandenburger v. Hilti, Inc., 52 Ohio App. 3d 21, 27-28, 556
N.E.2d 212, 219 (1989); Kuhn v. St. John & West Shore Hosp., 50 Ohio App. 3d 23, 25,
552 N.E.2d 240, 242 (1989).
309. See Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 277-78, 452 N.E.2d at 1320-21 (distinguishing
conduct ihat gives rise to tort liability from conduct sufficiently egregious to justify punitive
damages); cf. Columbus Fin., Inc. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 183-84, 327 N.E.2d
654, 658 (1975) (malice required for punitive damages may be inferred from surrounding
circumstances).
310. See supra text accompanying note 24.
311. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
312. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 709, 765 P.2d 373, 407,
254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 245 (1988) (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
313. See id. (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in em-
ployment contracts is a duty imposed by law, not one arising from
the terms of the contract.314 It is "non-consensual in origin and
reflects the values of society as a whole and society's interest in
protecting its members from harm on account of non-consensual
conduct. 31 5 It also reflects society's interest in fully compensating
those members who have been injured by intentional employer
conduct.316 While contract damages are limited to lost wages and
benefits, tort remedies allow compensation for the full scope of
injuries that a wrongful discharge causes. Thus pain and mental
anguish and loss of reputation, seniority, career opportunity, and
job security should be compensable in tort. Tort remedies also
would enable deterrence of socially abhorrent conduct through the
award of punitive damages.
Fawcett rejected the proposition that society could limit the
right of the employer to maliciously discharge employees.3 17 It is
time to reject Fawcett. Its holding offends public policy, logic, and
fundamental fairness.3 18 It has always been "the function of the
314. See id., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 710, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 246-47, 765 P.2d 373, 408
(1988) (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 716, 254 Cal. Rptr.
at 251, 765 P.2d at 413 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gates v.
Life of Montana Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 307, 668 P.2d 213, 214-15 (1983).
315. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 716, 765 P.2d at 413, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (Kaufman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
316. See id. (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
317. Fawcett, 46 Ohio St. 2d at 250, 348 N.E.2d at 147-48.
318. Foster v. McDevitt, 31 Ohio App. 3d 237, 511 N.E.2d 403 (1986), shows how
far Fawcett's condonation of malicious conduct can be taken. There, an employer had ad-
mitted her dislike of the employee and her intention to force him to quit. The employer
knew that the employee had a heart condition, but she often berated him without justifica-
tion in the presence of others, reduced his pay and responsibilities, and forced him to do
heavy physical labor. The employer then terminated the employee while he was recuper-
ating from his hospitalization for angina pectoris. The employee's condition continued to
worsen after his discharge, and he died some months later. His widow brought an action
for wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death. The
wrongful discharge claim was dismissed in accordance with Fawcett. Id. at 238, 511
N.E.2d at 405.
Even more shocking is the effect of Fawcett on the infliction of emotional distress
claim. Since the Fawcett view of employment at will made the discharge lawful, it could
not be used as evidence in the emotional distress claim. Id. at 239, 511 N.E.2d at 406.
However, the court held that the other evidence of the employer's outrageous behavior was
sufficient to overrule the directed verdict for the defendant on the emotional distress issue.
Id. at 240, 511 N.E.2d at 407-08.
Foster now is cited for the proposition that "conduct which may at times be extreme
and outrageous is in some circumstances privileged. In an at-will employment situation, the
employer will not be liable where the act does no more than involve the legal right held by
the employer." Brzozowski v. Stouffer Hotel Co., No. 55865, 1989 Ohio LEXIS 3591, at 6
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common law 'to protect the weak from the insults of the
stronger.' "3119 Recognition of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is the next step in that common law tradition.
IV. BEYOND EXCEPTIONS: JUSTIFYING JUST CAUSE
[I]t is clear that the employment-at-will doctrine in Ohio is to-
day alive and well in an employment relationship which is, with-
out more, clearly at will. Such a relationship permits termina-
tion of employment for no cause or for "any cause" which is not
unlawful, at any time and regardless of motive. 20
In Greeley, the Ohio Supreme Court changed the face of
Ohio employment law when it recognized a public policy excep-
tion to employment at will. Justice Douglas, writing for the major-
ity, downplayed the significance of the decision, emphasizing its
narrowness.321 Justice Wright's dissent warned that the exception
may open the door to far greater erosion of the doctrine.3 22 Both
may have been correct. In fact, Greeley will not have much practi-
cal effect on Ohio employment relations. Fawcett has only been
"modified, ' 323 and the number of employees affected by the nar-
row public policy exception is minuscule.3 24 However, if Holmes's
prediction for the future is borne out, the effects of Greeley may
extend far beyond its immediate holding.
Yet even total rejection of Fawcett and recognition of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing would only provide a rem-
edy for those employees who could prove malicious intent. For the
vast majority of wrongfully discharged employees whose discharge
cannot be characterized as malicious, there is no protection. 25
(Sept. 14, 1989).
319. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 715, 765 P.2d at 412, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (Broussard, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 3 1765)).
320. Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 49 Ohio St. 3d 228,
234, 551 N.E.2d 981, 986-87 (1990) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). Compare id. at
235, 551 N.E.2d at 987 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The majority of this court again bashes
the long-standing employment-at-will doctrine in its continuing desire to annihilate it.").
321. Id. at 234-35, 551 N.E.2d at 987.
322. Id. at 237, 551 N.E.2d at 989 (Wright, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 234, 551 N.E.2d at 987.
324. There has not been a single recorded appellate case dealing with the
whistleblower protection act, Oino REv. CODE A'Nt. §§ 4113.51-53 (Anderson 1991), since
it went into effect on June 29, 1988.
325. A continuum of employee rights exists:
at-will >> public policy >> good faith/fair dealing >> just cause >> implied
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The time has come to confront openly the rule and assess its
viability. After six years of wrestling with the issue of employment
at will, the debate in Ohio courts has never gone beyond the ques-
tion of exceptions to the at-will framework. The Ohio Supreme
Court has yet to address substantively the underlying issue of the
at-will framework. In Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co.,326 three
sentences in the text and two in a footnote are devoted to the ra-
tionales underlying the employment-at-will doctrine.327 Likewise,
Phung v. Waste Management, Inc.3 2  provides only one perfunc-
tory sentence justifying employment at will.3 29 Other recent em-
ployment-at-will decisions contain no discussion whatsoever of the
rationales or current viability of the at-will doctrine.30
contract.
As one moves to the right on the scale, the exceptions increasingly limit the unfettered
discretion of employment at will. The step from at will to a public policy exception repre-
sents the abolition of the absolutist conception of employment at will, a major qualitative
change. Little changes, however, in employment relations as a whole. Recognition of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing further decreases the scope of the at-will
rule. This step changes the level of employer misbehavior needed to establish a wrongful
discharge claim from willful and malicious conduct that violates public policy to all willful
and malicious conduct. Just cause changes the standard even further, from willful and
malicious conduct to unjust conduct. The step to just cause also changes the burden of
proof. For example, in union contexts, where the just cause standard is generally used, the
burden rests on the employer to show that the discharge was for a just (business) cause.
326. 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
327. They read:
However, we are not persuaded that modem developments which have taken
place in employment relations constitute a sufficient basis for us to now totally
abolish the employment-at-will doctrine. Such an action would, among other
things, place Ohio's courts in the untenable position of having to second-guess
the business judgments of employers. The need for certainty and continuity in
the law requires us to stand by precedent and not disturb a settled point unless
extraordinary circumstances require it.
Id. at 103, 483 N.E.2d at 153.
The presumption is grounded on a policy that it would otherwise be unreasona-
ble for a man to bind himself permanently to a position, thus eliminating the
possibility of later improving that position. Moreover, a contract of permanent
employment is by its very nature indefinite, and thus any effort to interpret the
duration of the contract and assess the amount of damages becomes difficult.
Id. at 102 n.1, 483 N.E.2d at 153 n.1 (quoting Henkel v. Educational Research Council of
Am., 45 Ohio St. 2d 249, 255, 344 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1976)).
328. 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1115 (1986).
329. "A fundamental policy in favor of the employment-at-will doctrine is the princi-
ple that parties to a contractual relationship should have complete freedom to fashion
whatever relationship they so desire." Id. at 102, 491 N.E.2d at 1116.
330. See, e.g., Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 49 Ohio St.
3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990); Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 46 Ohio St. 3d 134, 545
N.E.2d 1244 (1989); Worrell v. Multipress, Inc., 45 Ohio St. 3d 241, 543 N.E.2d 1277
(1989); Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, 45 Ohio St. 3d 131, 543 N.E.2d 1212
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An at-will employment relationship can no longer be pre-
sumed. The need to carve more and more exceptions out of this
antiquated rule demonstrates the wisdom of reeyaluating it. A
broader analysis is essential for the construction of more equitable
and efficient remedies.
A. Basic Fairness
The employment-at-will doctrine should be abandoned in
favor of a standard of "just cause" for termination. A rule that
allows an employer to terminate an employee "for good cause or
for no cause, or even for bad cause"3 31 violates the most basic
principles of fundamental fairness. A rule that permits the "gross
or reckless disregard of [employee] rights and interests, [and] wil-
ful, wanton or malicious acts"3 32 against them contravenes basic
standards of decency. On a conceptual level, there is little to jus-
tify an unfettered employer right to treat employees unfairly.3 33
Employment at will ignores principles of equal treatment and
due process that our society upholds in almost every other area of
law. Ironically, these principles are upheld in every area of em-
ployment law except employment at will. For instance, just cause
protection from unfair discharge is the rule for unionized employ-
ees.3 34 A large portion of civil service employees also enjoy sub-
stantial protection from unfair discharge.33 5 Federal33 6 and
state337 legislation protects employees who are members of certain
(1989).
331. Payne v. Western & Adt. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on
other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 544, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915).
332. Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio St. 2d 245, 249, 348 N.E.2d 144, 147
(1976).
333. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full
Flower, 67 NEB. L. Rav. 56, 66 (1988) (reviews the foundations of the at-will presumption
and calls for statutory solutions in response to legitimate employee expectations).
334. "[A]pproximately ninety-five percent of the collective bargaining agreements
contain grievance and arbitration provisions, and approximately eighty percent of the
agreements specifically require that there be cause or just cause for a discharge." Peck,
Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHfo ST. L.J.
1, 8 (1979) (citations omitted).
335. "Over ninety percent of these federal civilian employees are tenured and enjoy
the procedural safeguards that Congress and the Civil Service Commission have provided
against "adverse action" taken by supervisors .... [A] conservative estimate would be
that more than half of [state employees] are so protected." Id. at 8-9.
336. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988);
see supra text accompanying notes 35-40.
337. For example, the Ohio Civil Rights Act prohibits discharge on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age, or ancestry. Omo REV. CODE ANN. §
12551991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
classes from discriminatory discharge.
"The United States is one of the few industrial countries
which does not provide general legal protection against unjust dis-
missals." '38 About sixty-five nations now impose a statutory re-
quirement of just cause 'for discharge, including the European
Common Market countries, Sweden, Norway, Japan, Canada, and
others in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.8 39
In 1963 the International Labor Organization ("ILO")
adopted a recommendation declaring that there should be a "valid
reason for [a job] termination connected with the capacity or con-
duct of the worker or based on the operational requirements [of
the employer] . ' In 1982 the ILO called a special convention
that reaffirmed this recommendation and called for increased sub-
stantive and procedural safeguards in termination cases.3 41
In today's industrial society, employment plays a central role
in defining one's self-image. 42 Stable employment allows employ-
ees to enjoy present income, future income security through pen-
sions, and job preferences and career opportunities through senior-
ity. A job also provides a sense of identity and status in the
community. Discharge may mark an employee's record and pre-
vent future employment. The older worker may be at a particular
disadvantage from discharge.
Because of its ramifications, an employment contract is not
just another commercial transaction. Nevertheless, our employ-
ment law treats it like an agreement for the sale of goods. In fact,
the at-will doctrine treats the employment contract worse. Con-
tracts for the sale of goods are governed by the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, which attempts to bring the law of commercial con-
tracts into accordance with modern business practices.
4112.02(A) (Anderson 1991).
338. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481, 508 (1976).
339. AMERICAN BAR AWS'N, supra note 13, at 18-19.
340. Id. at 18.
341. See Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 207, 211-16 (1983).
342. As one commentator has noted:
One's job provides not only income essential to the acquisition of the necessities
of life, but also the opportunity to shape the aspirations of one's family, aspira-
tions which are both moral and educational. Along with marital relations and
religion, it is hard to think of what might be viewed as more vital in our society
than the opportunity to work and retain one's employment status.
Gould, The Idea of Job as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective
Bargaining Framework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 885, 892.
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Employment contracts are governed by 'a theoretical model that is
over one hundred years old and ill-suited to twentieth century em-
ployment relations and expectations. 43
B. Theoretical Arguments: Freedom of Contract v. Contractual
Justice
Employment at will has found few academic defenders. The
main advocate of the doctrine, Richard Epstein, has grafted an
economic analysis onto the basic nineteenth century model of the
employment contract. 44 Epstein believes that the complete free-
dom of contract that exists under employment at will provides the
best possible arrangement to promote individual autonomy and
the efficiency of markets.345 Epstein argues that the at-will pre-
sumption is the best rule of construction for employment con-
tracts.3 46 By contrast, proponents of a just cause standard for ter-
mination maintain that employment-at-will freedom of contract
arguments mask a de facto denial of the individual freedom of the
employee, and that the benefits of the at-will scheme to employees
as well as the costs of a just cause regime to employers have been
greatly overstated.347 In addition, proponents argue that the at-
343. See Silard, Rights of the Accused Employee in Company Disciplinary Investi-
gation, in PROCEEDINGS OF N.Y.U. 22D ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 217, 219-26 (1970), reprinted
in D. ROTHSCHILD, L. MERRIFIELD & H. EDWARDS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR
ARBITRATION 560 (1979).
We have long passed the era of employment fluidity where a worker fired by one
employer could simply saddle his horse and settle in the next county in a new
job. With modern record keeping and employer cooperation systems the oppro-
brium of discharge may follow the employee wherever he goes. Moreover, in
many callings a man's job is his permanent career. Job seniority is the key to
preferred work and wages, and an employee with seniority can ill afford to start
afresh with another employer. Accumulated pension rights representing an enor-
mous capital asset for the employee are imperilled if he is discharged and must
begin new employment without pension crediting years of service.
Id.
344. See Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 947 (1984).
Epstein has argued on behalf of Ohio employers. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Ohio
Manufacturers Ass'n, Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d
1114 (1986) (No. 84-1909); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Ohio Chamber of Commerce,
Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986) (No. 84-
1909).
345. Epstein, supra note 344, at 951.
346. Id. at 952.
347. See generally Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limit-
ing the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967) (the at-will
rule magnifies the inherently greater power of the employer and threatens workers' individ-
ual freedom); Summers, supra note 26 (where there is inequality of bargaining power, such
12571991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
will presumption is a fundamentally incorrect rule of construction
for employment contracts.348
Epstein's twentieth century version of the nineteenth century
doctrine holds that the freedom to enter into a contract is as basic
as freedom of religion or freedom of speech.3 49 Government inter-
vention into the free choice of the parties is an unwarranted sub-
stitution of the judgment of a court or a legislature for the judg-
ment of the parties.35 0 "Any limitation upon the freedom to enter
into [at-will] contracts limits the power of workers as well as em-
ployers."3 51 According to this view, the at-will scheme is one of
mutual benefit that provides for the freedom of the employer to
terminate at will and the freedom of the employee to quit at will.
These arguments from the defenders of at-will theory ignore
the fact that the employer starts with much greater power than
the employee in an at-will system. Additionally, they rest on a
mutuality concept 52 that many courts have abandoned.3 5 The ne-
cessity of government intervention into employment relations was
a basic premise of the National Labor Relations Act and subse-
quent remedial legislation.3 54 The Act rejected the laissez-faire
formalism of the Lochner era when it expressly recognized the dif-
ference between abstract freedom of contract and actual liberty of
contract.35 5
One of the main arguments of both academics and employers
is that the at-will system works in practice.3 56 "It is hardly plausi-
ble that contracts at will could be so pervasive in all businesses
and at all levels if they did not serve the interests of employees as
well as employers. 3 57 According to this view, the at-will presump-
tion is an economically efficient framework for providing mutual
as in employment contracts, the law should protect the weaker party).
348. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 347; Summers, supra note 26.
349. See Epstein, supra note 344, at 953.
350. Id. at 954.
351. Id.
352. See id. at 957.
353. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 600, 292
N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980). Epstein does not discuss the questions of consideration and intent
that have been the focus of judicial and academic debate. See supra text accompanying
notes 45-64.
354. See supra text accompanying note 24.
355. See id.
356. "Employment at-will has functioned well for decades and will continue to do
so." Brief of Ohio Manufacturers Ass'n at 1, Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio
St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986)(No. 84-1909).
357. See Epstein, supra note 344, at 955.
1258 [Vol. 41:1209
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
benefits to the parties.158 Employers gain an efficient disciplinary
scheme. Firing and quitting are cheap means of resolving employ-
ment problems since this renders expensive monitoring unneces-
sary85 9 and eliminates litigation costs.360 Defenders of employment
at will also maintain that employees benefit from at-will con-
tracts.36' They may simply quit at any time that the employment
arrangement is not advantageous. As there is no implied term for
the contract, they will incur no litigation expenses as a result of
quitting.36 The at-will contract provides for limitations on the
employer's power since arbitrary action by the employer will
cause workers to begin to look elsewhere for employment secur-
ity.3 63 Epstein argues that because there are powerful correctives
against capricious discharge, the chance of arbitrary dismissal of
innocent employees is quite remote.364 The stigma of dismissal is
less troublesome when it is understood that discharge under an at-
will contract does not necessarily imply misconduct. 365
Epstein professes to conduct "a full analysis of the relevant
costs and benefits" of the at-will contract.366 His conception of rel-
evance, however, is quite limited. It centers on the costs and bene-
fits to the employer and fails to see the costs an at-will regime
imposes on wrongfully discharged employees. The loss of income,
benefits, security, and status that accompany termination do not
appear on Epstein's balance sheet. The realities of the job market
make it far easier for the employer to find another employee than
for the employee to find another job.36 7 Epstein's model ensures
358. See id. at 957.
359. See id. at 965.
360. See id. at 970 (a just cause rule would make summary judgment difficult to
grant, since motive would be a critical element).
361. See id. at 966.
362. Id. at 967.
363. Id. at 968.
364. Id. at 970.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 982.
367. As Justice Kaufman expressed it:
Indeed, I can think of no relationship in which one party, the employee, places
more reliance upon the other, is more dependent upon the other, or is more vul-
nerable to abuse by the other, than the relationship between employer and em-
ployee. And, ironically, the relative imbalance of economic power between em-
ployer and employee tends to increase rather than diminish the longer that
relationship continues. Whatever bargaining strength and marketability the em-
ployee may have at the moment of hiring, diminishes rapidly thereafter. Market-
place? What market is there for the factory worker laid-off after 25 years of
labor in the same plant, or for the middle-aged executive fired after 25 years
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that the more powerful party in the market will dictate the terms
of employment. In the employment context, the employer is, in
nearly all cases, the more powerful party.3 6s
Employers themselves take a more practical approach than
the theoretical justification offered by Epstein. They are more con-
cerned with litigation costs and loss of management prerogatives
than with abstract economic analysis. Employers object that fur-
ther limitation or abolition of employment at will would make the
law increasingly complex 69 and worry that just cause would re-
quire an elaborate structure for administration or arbitration.37 0
Yet problems of complexity stem from the at-will doctrine itself.
In order to relieve some of the harshest effects of employment at
will and still preserve the rule, the courts have been forced to cre-
ate a complex web of exceptions. Abolition of the rule and its ex-
ceptions would enable the construction of a far simpler system. It
is unlikely that any system would be as complex and entangled as
the one currently in place. Just cause achieves simplicity while
increasing overall fairness.
It is argued that abolishing the doctrine would require courts,
arbitrators, or administrators to second-guess the business judg-
ment of employers . 71 Limitations on the employer's freedom to
terminate would lead to limitations on the right to demote, trans-
fer, and discipline. 2 This could negatively affect the efficiency of
the operation.3 71 Companies, however, were able to live with the
costs of collective bargaining, of which just cause was a minor
component. It is significant that when employers were demanding
with the same firm?
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 718, 765 P.2d 373, 414-15, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211, 253 (1988) (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
368. Getman & Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Response to
Professor Epstein, 92 YALE U. 1415, 1429-31 (1983) (Epstein's model promotes employer
economic power by guaranteeing legal climate of mere formal freedom of contract).
369. See Epstein, supra note 344, at 953; Brief of Ohio Manufacturers Ass'n at 2,
Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986) (No. 84-
1909).
370. See Brief of Ohio Manufacturers Ass'n at 8, Phung v. Waste Management,
Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986) (No. 84-1909) (abolishing employment
at will would create "a morass of confusion among . . . administrative enforcement
agencies").
371. This fear was expressed in Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100,
103, 483 N.E.2d 150, 153 (1985).
372. See Epstein, supra note 344, at 972.
373. Brief of Ohio Manufacturers Ass'n at 2, Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23
Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986) (No. 84-1909).
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concessions from unions in the early 1980s, employers did not
press for elimination of the just cause standard for discharge.3 74
Not only was this because the costs of just cause were minimal, it
was also because the benefits were substantial. "Marked correla-
tions have been observed between a secure work force and high
productivity and quality output."375
Employers fear an avalanche of litigation resulting from the
limitation or abolition of employment at will. Even the recognition
of a narrow public policy exception would create litigation that
could "flood the court system,"3 7 6 "spawn vexatious litigation and
create judicial administrative chaos." ' Although wrongful dis-
charge litigation has increased over the last decade, this may
merely mean that more of the 150,000 employees that are wrong-
fully discharged every year 8 decided to seek redress.
Employment is one of the most important aspects of one's
life. As our society becomes increasing litigious, it should come as
no surprise that employment decisions become a prime focus of
litigation. The causality must be properly understood, however.
The basic injustice of the at-will rule has caused an increasing
number of wrongfully discharged employees to turn to the courts
for relief. It has also brought pressure to bear on the common law
courts to respond to the harshness of the rule. The declining mem-
bership of unions and the lower percentage of workers covered by
grievance arbitration procedures379 increases the pressure on the
courts. Indeed, as the unionized percentage of the work force
shrinks, our society is increasingly becoming a two-tiered system
of employment rights. More and more employees are at the mercy
of employment at will. The need to forge a new common law of
wrongful discharge increases as the ranks of the unprotected
swell.
374. St. Antoine, supra note 333, at 68.
375. Id. at 69.
376. Brief of Ohio Chamber of Commerce at 14, Phung v. Waste Management, Inc.,
23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986) (84-1909); see also Brief of Ohio Manufac-
turers Ass'n at 2, Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d
1114 (1986) (84-1909).
377. Brief of Ohio Chamber of Commerce at 83, Phung v. Waste Management, Inc.,
23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986)(84-1909).
378. Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-At-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557, 558
(1985).
379. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
12611991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
C. The Presumption Itself
Employment at will presumes that an employment contract
of indefinite duration is terminable at the will of either party. This
presumption was born of defective scholarship and an absence of
policy analysis.380 The presumption of employment at will has op-
erated as the rule of construction in employment contracts of an
indefinite duration when there has been no explicit agreement as
to the terms for discharge.38 l "[A] rule of construction is normally
chosen because it reflects the dominant practice in a given class of
cases and because that practice is itself regarded as making good
sense for the standard transactions it governs. 38s2 The presump-
tion must reflect the reasonable expectations of the parties to such
agreements. The at-will presumption fails to meet this standard.
The general understanding in most employment situations is
that, after a reasonable probationary period, the employee will
continue to be employed unless that employee fails to perform ad-
equately on the job, violates reasonable rules of conduct, or the
company has to eliminate that position for economic reasons. 8
This general understanding should form the basis of the presump-
tion that governs the common law of employment termination, not
a harsh, formalistic rule from another century. The common law
process would then refine the new presumption in subsequent deci-
sions. This did not occur in Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co.38 4 but
380. See Feinman, supra note 8, at 126 (discussing the lack of legal authority for
early statements of the employment-at-will rule).
381. See, e.g., Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 102, 491
N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (1986); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 103, 483
N.E.2d 150, 153 (1985); Henkel v. Educational Research Council of Am., 45 Ohio St. 2d
249, 255, 344 N.E.2d 118, 121-22 (1976).
382. Epstein, supra note 344, at 951.
383. This has been the common wisdom of arbitrators for decades. Roger Abrams
and Dennis Nolan have deemed this the "fundamental understanding" that inheres in most
modem employment relations:
This fundamental understanding of the employment relationship can be easily
summarized: both parties realize that the employer must pay the agreed wages
and benefits and that the employee must do "satisfactory" work. "Satisfactory"
work, in this context, has four elements: (1) regular attendance, (2) obedience to
reasonable work rules, (3) a reasonable quantity and quality of work, and (4)
avoidance of any conduct that would interfere with the employer's ability to op-
erate the business successfully. The common phrase, "a fair day's work for a fair
day's pay," attempts to capture the essence of this understanding.
Abrams & Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985
DUKE L.J. 594, 597.
384. 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
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is shown in the guidelines of Worrell v. Multipress, Inc.385
Employment contract analysis would treat the new presump-
tion as rebuttable in light of express and implied understandings.
The employee would have to make an initial showing that the "job
continued after her dismissal and that she remained suitable for
the job. '386 The employer, then, would have to present a credible
justification for the termination. The burden of production would
be on the employer since it is the party most likely to possess the
necessary information.38 7 "As in any civil litigation when the
plaintiff alleges an injury by the defendant, the ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact. . . should rest with the employee." 388
The problem of disclaimers will crop up again under a pre-
sumption of just cause. Some of the most progressive decisions in
the implied contract exceptions have held that express affirmations
of an at-will relationship are dispositive. 389 Some commentators
contend that at-will attestations are binding since they are pre-
sumably exchanged for some form of increased compensation.390
Yet this ignores the great inequality of bargaining power that is
present in the vast majority of employment contracts. The use of
disclaimers could effectively negate any just cause standard. A
strong presumption against the legitimacy of such disclaimers is
essential if the just cause standard is to have any meaning.
The at-will presumption has little foundation in theory or pol-
icy. It claims legitimacy on the basis of its track record. Defenders
of employment at will say it has worked well, but they only find
employer concerns relevant.3 91 Proponents of just cause reply that
the costs of employment at will to employees are staggering. 392
The question that remains is whether a just cause presumption is
an effective basis for adjudicating termination disputes.
A just cause standard would not create an avalanche of liti-.
385. 45 Ohio St. 3d 241, 543 N.E.2d 1277 (1989).
386. Leonard, supra note 22, at 682.
387. Id. at 683.
388. Id.
389. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980).
390. See Leonard, supra note 22, at 682 n.299; see also Epstein, A Common Law
for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357,
1382 (1983) (discussing the yellow dog contract and employer paternalism).
391. See supra text accompanying notes 356-68.
392. See, e.g., Stieber, supra note 378, at 558 (two million workers are discharged
each year without the right to a hearing; of these, 150,000 may have been unjustly
discharged).
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gation. The more likely effect of a just cause standard would be
not an increase in the number of claims brought but a decrease in
the number of dismissals and summary judgments granted to em-
ployers in these actions. More claims would be heard on the mer-
its. 93 The common law system already has a screening device to
limit the number of claims presented, the high cost of bringing
legal action. Most employees are unable to afford litigation costs,
and "most claims are too small to produce a viable contingent
fee."394 Employees that do bring actions are usually overwhelmed
by the employer's high-priced counsel.39 5
The concern for unreasonably high jury awards is legitimate.
However, the judicial recognition of a just cause standard will not
inexorably produce "a lottery with a few big winners and many
losers."39 6 Punitive damages are necessary for general deterrence
and for actual punishment in the very small number of particu-
larly egregious cases. 9 7 The court must establish clear standards
that limit punitive damages to extreme cases. Ohio law has done
this with emotional distress damages in the case of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.3 9 8 The same can be done to restrict
the award of punitive damages. The Supreme Court can also en-
courage the use of remittitur to enforce its standards. Thus pre-
dictability in the size of awards can be achieved under a just
393. In 1988 Ohio appellate courts decided 46 wrongful discharge cases. Thirty-two
of these involved summary judgment in favor of the employer. Of these, 26 (81%) were
upheld. In 1989, 19 summary judgments in favor of the employer were appealed, and 15
(79%) were affirmed. In 1990, 34 summary judgments in favor of the employer were ap-
pealed, and 22 (65%) were affirmed.
394. Summers, supra note 26, at 25.
395. Roel, Advances in Campaign for Workers' Rights: Laws, Court Rulings Offer
Protection in Areas Where Bill of Rights Doesn't, Newsday, Jan. 10, 1988, at 92 (Nassau
& Suffolk ed.).
396. Summers, supra note 26, at 25-26.
397. See supra text accompanying note 80.
398. In Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983), the
Ohio Supreme Court first recognized that tort and established standards which have lim-
ited its application to a small number of examples of outrageous conduct. The Yeager court
described with great specificity the standards that should be used in evaluating a claim for
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 374-75, 453 N.E.2d at 671-
72. These standards have been applied to limit the use of this cause of action in wrongful
discharge cases. See, e.g., Brzozowski v. Stouffer Hotel Co., No. 55865, 1989 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3591 (Sept. 14, 1989); Hines v. Center for Human Serv., No. 54021, 1988 Ohio
App. LEXIS 2540 (June 16, 1988); Moore v. Middletown Regional Hosp., No. CA86-11-
166, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. June 22, 1987); Foster v. McDevitt, 31 Ohio App. 3d 237, 511
N.E.2d 403 (1986); Jenkins v. Goodyear Atomic Corp., No. 389, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 27, 1986) (Ohio LEXIS).
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cause regime.
Predictability in outcomes must be obtained by defining the
standards for just cause through the selection of proper cases for
review. Just cause will never be governed by bright line distinc-
tions but that should not be any more a bar to its use than the
imprecision of the term "negligence." Labor arbitrators have not
found the lack of a specific definition for just cause to hinder its
application to concrete cases. 399
Adequate compensation would be provided by the award of
back pay and front pay as defined in Worrell.400 Reinstatement
should be an option if the circumstances warrant. The lack of a
union to prevent harassment may make this impossible in many
cases. Punitive damages should only be permitted in cases of ac-
tual malice. Emotional distress should be dealt with as an inde-
pendent tort.
D. Common Law Process or Judicial Legislation?
Defenders of employment at will in Ohio have argued that
major changes in the common law of employment discharge
should be left to the legislature.40 1 The Ohio Supreme Court's po-
sition has varied. In Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., where the ap-
pellant had called for the abolition of the doctrine, the court indi-
cated it had the power to abolish employment at will but that the
circumstances did not warrant such an action.40 2 In Phung v.
Waste Management, Inc., the court abdicated responsibility to the
legislaure.40 3 Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors,
Inc. implicitly rejected the deference of Phung and put the court
back in the business of forging the common law of employment
termination.404
The Ohio Supreme Court need not limit its role to fashioning
exceptions to employment at will. Although the General Assembly
has never spoken on the question of the viability of employment at
399. See Abrams & Nolan, supra note 383, at 597.
400. 45 Ohio St. 3d at 245-48, 543 N.E.2d at 1282-83.
401. See Brief of Ohio Manufacturers Ass'n at 9, Phung v. Waste Management,
Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986) (84-1909); Brief of Ohio Chamber of
Commerce at 19, Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d
1114 (1986) (84-1909).
402. 19 Ohio St. 3d at 103-04, 483 N.E.2d at 153-54.
403. 23 Ohio St. 3d at 103, 491 N.E.2d at 1117.
404. 49 Ohio St. 3d at 233-34, 551 N.E.2d at 989-90 (public policy considerations
warrant carving an exception to employment at will).
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will, the doctrine was the creation of the common law courts, not
the legislatures.0 5 Its limitation or abolition is certainly a legiti-
mate function of those same courts. "Section 16 [of Article I of
the Ohio Constitution] requires Ohio courts to 'be open, and every
person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or repu-
tation, shall have remedy by due course of law. .... , ",406 The
Ohio Supreme Court has recognized "the primary duty" to uphold
this right to a judicial remedy for every legitimate injury. 41 The
dissent in Phung noted that this right was especially applicable to
a judicially created doctrine such as employment at will.40 8
Invalidating the at-will presumption would be no more inap-
propriate than the common law courts' declaration that privity of
contract was no longer required in products liability suits.40 9 This
holding upset the nineteenth century rule of privity established in
Winterbottom v. Wright.410 Like today's defenders of employment
at will, the Winterbottom court maintained that a flood of litiga-
tion and outrageous consequences would follow without its harsh
requirement of privity.41I By the second half of the nineteenth
century, the rule had gained general acceptance.412 The harshness
of this principle led to the creation of a number of exceptions to
the privity rule. For example, there was an exception for products
that were imminently dangerous to the lives of innocent third par-
ties.413 In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Judge Cardozo effec-
tively abolished the privity requirement by expanding an exception
405. See supra text accompanying notes 9-23.
406. Phung, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 107, 491 N.E.2d at 1120 (Brown, J., dissenting)
(quoting OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16).
407. Id. (Brown, J., dissenting) (quoting Kintz v. Harringer, 99 Ohio St. 240, 244,
124 N.E. 168, 169 (1919)).
408. Id.
409. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
410. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). The privity rule was later
shown to be based on a misinterpretation of Winterbottom. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEE-
TON & D. OWEN, supra note 303, §96, at 681.
411. The Winterbottom court declared:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue,
every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by
the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the
operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.
Winterbottom, 10 M. & W. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
412. See, e.g., Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N.E. 482
(1907).
413. See, e.g., Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882); Thomas v. Winchester, 6.N.Y.
397 (1852).
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so as to swallow the rule.414 The MacPherson holding was rapidly
accepted and is hornbook law today.4 15
Cardozo declared that "[p]recedents drawn from the days of
travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel to-day. 416
Employment at will also dates from the days of stagecoach travel.
The nineteenth century has passed and the twentieth is in its last
decade. Current conditions, expectations, and social needs make it
entirely appropriate for a common law court to reject anachronis-
tic doctrine.
The recognition of a just cause standard for termination can
provide a fair and effective system for adjudication of employment
termination disputes. Though it might bring some increase in liti-
gation, there are some costs that society must bear to provide jus-
tice. The just cause standard would provide a means of redress to
those employees who are presently without any recourse or rem-
edy.411 The new presumption would reflect a proper adjustment of
the common law to current employment relations and to the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties. When compared to the present
regime of employment at will, recognition of just cause represents
a giant step forward from freedom of contract to contractual jus-
tice. It is both proper and necessary for the Ohio Supreme Court
to take this step.
E. Beyond Litigation
There are ways to administer a just cause regime that could
even further lower adjudicative costs, produce more uniform out-
comes, and lessen the imbalance of power between the parties. A
statutory system of administrative screening and mediation com-
bined with final arbitration would improve upon the advances of a
judicial recognition of just cause.418
414. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEErON & D. OWEN, supra note 303, §96, at 683.
415. See id. at § 96; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1964).
416. MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 391, I11 N.E. at 1053.
417. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
418. See generally Bellace, supra note 341, at 232-33 (advocating the implementa-
tion of laws regarding unfair termination through existing government agencies); Blades,
supra note 347, at 1433 (fair employment practices commissions should be exclusive tribu-
nals for wrongful discharge cases); Gould, supra note 342, at 908 (discussing the utility of
the arbitration system in applying the just cause standard); St. Antoine, supra note 333, at
77 (notes that adopting an arbitration system for unjust discharge cases would make a
wide range a arbitral precedent available concerning substance and procedure); Summers,
supra note 338, at 521 (argues that the "substantial cadre" of experienced arbitrators cou-
pled with state administered forums would provide a flexible solution to any increase in
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Many proposals for such statutory systems have been ad-
vanced in journals.41 In 1987 Montana's Wrongful Discharge
from Employment Act420 was passed, effectively abolishing em-
ployment at will in that jurisdiction. The Act created a cause of
action for termination without just cause and made arbitration of
termination disputes a voluntary option.42' The draft Uniform
Employment Termination Act of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws provides for a just cause
standard that is administered solely by arbitration.4 2  Statutory
arbitration provides a greater measure of justice, uniformity, and
economy, yet its realization involves a far greater social and politi-
cal mobilization than do common law solutions.
However, it is not likely that the General Assembly will con-
sider wrongful discharge legislation in the near future. There is no
wrongful discharge crisis in Ohio courts at present. Ohio employ-
ers feel no need to engage in legislative compromise when the
courts generally grant summary judgment against employee
wrongful discharge claims.423 In addition, employers have well-fi-
nanced and organized lobbies to prevent such legislation. No cor-
responding organization exists to press for a just cause statute.
Although organized labor has gone on record as favoring wrongful
discharge legislation, it has done little to support this position.42 4
The Ohio judiciary need not wait for the legislature to act. In
fact, the courts may serve as a catalyst for the legislature. Mon-
unjust discharge cases).
419. Summers first advocated a statute to provide for a just cause standard for ter-
mination enforced by arbitration. See Summers, supra note 338, at 531. Gould and St.
Antoine have made similar proposals. See Gould, supra note 342, at 911; St. Antoine,
supra note 333, at 71. One commentator has proposed using state unemployment compen-
sation boards as an administrative structure for deciding employment termination claims.
See Bellace, supra note 341, at 232.
420. MON'. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 (1991).
421. See id. §39-2-904(2).
422. UNIF. EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT (Draft Mar. 11, 1990).
423. See supra note 393.
424. The AFL-CIO Executive Council announced its position on employment at will
in 1987, proposing the following minimum elements for a statute:
- A prohibition on discharges without cause.
- Financing to assure that discharged employees will be able to enforce their
statutory rights.
- Prompt review of discharge decisions by an independent tribunal.
- Mandatory reinstatement for any employee who is found to have been dis-
charged wrongfully.
- Full compensation for losses sustained as the result of a wrongful discharge.
AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE 44, 46 (1987).
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tana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act came in re-
sponse to.judicial action.425 Other proposed wrongful discharge
legislation has come in jurisdictions that have recognized excep-
tions to employment at will.426 The courts have the right and the
duty to abolish a harsh, unfair, ill-conceived, and inefficient rule
that "simply persists from blind imitation of the past. 42
CONCLUSION
A rational and fair system of dealing with employment termi-
nation is possible. The first step is replacing the anachronistic em-
ployment-at-will presumption with reasonable presumptions for
employment contract termination. Recent Ohio Supreme Court
decisions have returned to the sense of promise and possibility of
the mid-1980s. The continuation of this common law momentum
and analysis of the fundamental assumptions of employment law
can enable future legislation to better serve all the interests in-
volved. The Ohio Supreme Court has the authority in logic, law,
and equity to do so.
TODD M. SMITH
425. See Tompkins, Legislating the Employment Relationship: Montana's Wrongful
Discharge Law, 14 EMP. REj. L.J. 387 (1988).
426. See St. Antoine, supra note 333, at 71-81 (citing proposed wrongful discharge
legislation in California, Michigan, and New Jersey).
427. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that ... it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.
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